THE US, THE USSR, AND THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE OPTION

DURING THE COLD WAR (1958-1968)

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This Thesis was submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Master's Degree of Art in Diplomatic Studies

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

The University of Jordan

April, 2008

The University of Jordan

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Date: 21 / 5 /2008.

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Dedication

I dedicate this Thesis to my Family, Husband and Children, for their outstanding support and patience, and especially, for my Husband who helped me a lot on technical issues relating to computer and internet usage, without which it would have been very difficult for me to finish this Thesis.

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to Dr. Walid Abu Dalbouh for his encouragement and support, and also for the endless hours he spent with me and his persuasive advice throughout my work on this Thesis.

I am also grateful to my Cousin Naheel Al-Masri for her encouragement and motivation to pursue my studies to obtain my Master's degree.

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List of Abbreviations

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
COMECON	Mutual Economic Assistance
GDR	German Democratic Republic
ICBM	International ballistic missile
MAD	Mutually assured destruction
ABM	anti- ballistic missile
IR	International relation
EDC	Education Development Center
KGB	Russian Committee for State Security
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
Excom	Executive Committee
MD	Mutual Deterrence
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
BMD	Ballistic missile defenses
IAEA	International Atomic Energy
NPT	Non proliferation of nuclear weapons
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
GNPs	Gross national products

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ABSTRACT

This thesis has dealt excessively with the Cold War era with all its rivalries, anxieties, and unquestionable dangers exposed by the then two superpowers during the period of 1958-1968. Indeed, the development of nuclear weapons has had, advanced the efficacy of balance of power and deterrence alike in preventing conflict and as a result was deemed a critical stabilizing factor on the post World War II international system.

Accordingly, this research aims at understanding the extent to which nuclear technology on the one hand and deterrence on the other affected the conclusion of the course of the US-Soviet relations during the Cold War. Also it will try to envisage whether the different heated incidents between the two superpowers during the period of 1958-1968– as demonstrated within the empirical cases mitigated or undermined the viability and the leverage of deterrence as a strategic option in maintaining state of international stability. The thesis will be heavily pursuing descriptive and analytical approach based on historical

foundations. Primary sources as well as secondary literatures become the main source of information due to the nature of such investigation.

In short, the thesis concludes that over the course of the ten years period of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was built around survivable retaliatory capabilities on both sides within which strategic relations between the USA and USSR became predictably stable over time. Consequently, no new world war had erupted regardless how crucial and critical the incidents intensified then.

I.I Introduction:

One of the most salient characteristics of the Cold War period is attributed to the fact that the two major powers then had not fall into direct confrontation since the end of the 1945 World War II. Such "stabilizing" era of relations among these states was unprecedented. Realizing the amounting cautious measures each state has treated its counterpart, the competing superpower parties recognized the need to make concessions at certain crucial stages then to avoid venturing too near the brink of war. This atmosphere of intense rivalry lasted for over 40 years which spread from Europe, where it originated, to the rest of the world. Although, there was no open direct fighting between the great powers, there were a few instances when the Cold War spilled over into almost direct and open confrontation between the superpowers.

Apart from this, all other features of non-confrontational warfare were present. There were fear, hostility, suspicion, competition, threats between them, yet the obvious feature of direct fighting was avoided. Neither side wished to risk the prospect of a "hot war." In view of that, the question worth asking here is: to what extent the role of arms race in nuclear weapons facilitated the advancement to such end and how? As shown in the course of the following chapters, the research advocates that the situation attributed to the existence of nuclear weapons that helped to keep the state of stability between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War era.

I.II Hypothesis of the Research

The Cold War era had produced the longest period of stability in relations among the great powers that the world has known in this century.

The fear of the nuclear weapons made both countries deterred from highly provocative behavior by a mutual fear of escalation to a general war in which the level of nuclear destruction to the civilian infrastructure and population would be exceed any possible gain for either side. Consequently, each would avoid provoking the other in the extreme. That is what we call the nuclear deterrence. Over the course of the cold war, this nuclear deterrence was built around survivable retaliatory capabilities on both sides, made strategic relations between the USA, USSR predictably stable, over time this notion became as widely accepted as synonymous to the balance of terror concept.

I.III Purpose of the Research

This thesis will try to analyze the role of the nuclear deterrence during the Cold War era between 1958-1968 on the one hand, and to examine the relationship between the nuclear deterrence and stability on the other mainly through the examination of three main crises in Soviet- American relations during the said period: the Berlin, the Cuban missile, and the Czechoslovakia crises and of 1960, 1962 and 1968 respectively. In running out this list, the paper may envisage the efficacy of deterrence based in technology in preventing war and promoting stability.

I.IV. The Significance of the Research

The significance of this research comes within what appears a 'rebirth of Cold War' period nowadays between the traditional enemies. Indeed, the depicted circumstances that took place yesterday may reflect today's scenarios within which deterrence – based on technological innovations- becomes a key factor in determining and shaping conflict outcomes. What prevented yesterday's confrontations may similarly remain a decisive player in preventing today's potential direct military clash considering that technological development nowadays are much more sophisticated and destructive than ever.

I.V. Literature Review

Liberalism and the realism schools of thought are the main traditional schools which remain to be salient today in dealing with political circumstances; the primary goal of these two schools was to eliminate conflicts in the international community and to establish stability. Although their primary goals are considerably identical, they nonetheless have different approaches to accomplish it. Realists believed that stability can be achieved through the search for power and security. It uses notions of order, deterrence, and balance of power, to convey its message of constraint and to reify the structure of international system. Liberals, on the other hand, believed that stability can be achieved through cooperation between nations based on mutual interests and confidence building measures.

This section will discuss the subject of stability from the view points of the two dominant schools of thought in the study of international relations; Liberalism and Realism.

Realists:

1) John Herz

John Herz examines the nature of the security dilemma in post World War Two international relations. In 1959 he published <u>International Politics in the Atomic Age</u>[1] within which he introduced readers to the conflicting views over the rise of the permeability of the sovereign state. The book is divided into two main parts. The first part provides an account of the rise of the state that focuses on the role of military technology, whilst the second describes the crisis of the state in the nuclear era.

Hertz argues that nuclear weapons have now destroyed the impermeability of the sovereign state, so that traditional balance of power politics are finally obsolete. Of course, the realist according to him acknowledges that the security dilemma still operates, even though the means used to tame it undermine the purpose of doing so. Throughout the book Herz laments the way in which the United States and the Soviet Union have failed to adapt to the new situation, building thousands more weapons than are required for the purpose of deterrence. The appalling condition of nuclear overkill and the elaborate schemes of civilian strategists and nuclear weapons designers to escape the new security dilemma have meant that losing sight of the more fundamental problem: The very fact that technical developments of weapons and armaments in themselves wield such a tremendous impact has meant that they have almost come to dictate policies instead of policies determining type and choice of weapons, their use, amount of armaments. In other expression, instead of weapons serving policy, policy is becoming the more servant of a weapon that more and more constitutes its own raison dêtre.

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[1] Herz, J. International Politics in the Atomic Age, P220-253

In short, according to him, the world had become too small for traditional territoriality and the protection it had previously provided. The balance of terror was not the continuation of the old balance of power. War, which had functioned as part of the dynamics of the balance, was no longer a rational means of policy. Herz claimed that strength of state sovereignty which had once considered idealistic was now an overriding national interest.

In the 1950 he had implied that the territorial state was in demise. Technological change, which he had claimed was a crucial factor in determining the rise of the state, would not facilitate the emergence of new forms of transnational and co-operative governance. Herz felt confident that, which in the 1930s were associated with idealism, were now consistent with realism.

Herz identifies three reasons for the continuation of territoriality as a marker of political differentiation. First, decolonization had led to a remarkable creation of new states. Second, the technological determinism was deterministic. Third, the balance of terror was more forceful than Herz had thought a decade earlier. In 1968, he argued that, if the nuclear arms race was to be controlled in the future, a holding operation was necessary. This would consist of a set of policies such as arms control, demarcation of bloc spheres, avoidance the role of the ideologies of communism and anticommunism.

This is the context in which hertz defended the policies of détente in the late 1960s and 1970s. He did so by reinforcing the distinction between constraints that were inherent in the security dilemma and misplaced perceptions of those constraints based of inappropriate images of international relations. He attacked the argument proposed by some conservative

critics, that détente was a form of appeasement. [2]Herz argued that there was little similarity between the international situation of the 1930 and the détente era. The United States was negotiating from a position of strength not weakness. The existence of nuclear weapons ensured the aggression on the part of the Soviet Union would be an act of suicide, and that détente, far from being a radical departure from realism, was in fact merely a prerequisite for more radical policies in the common interest of humankind in survival.

For Herz the Cold War came to an end because one superpower could no longer sustain its competition with the west, on ideological or economic terms. Thus it did not come to an end as a result of any policy makers deciding to place the human interest over the national interest. Although the fear of nuclear war between the great powers had lessened, it has been replaced by new fears of nuclear proliferation and the legacy of old images lives on.

2) Raymond Aron

Inspired by the work of Hobbes and Clausewitz, Raymond Aron, in his book, <u>Peace and War</u>[3], shared the realist view that there was a fundamental difference between domestic and international relations. For Aron, foreign policy is constituted by diplomatic strategic behavior, and international relations takes place in the shadow of war. By this, he did not mean that war was always likely, but that the legitimacy of violence to secure state goals was shared among states and it could not be monopolized as it had been within the territorial boundaries of the state. In his most famous phrase, international relations are

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[2]Herz, J. The Nation-State and the crisis of World politics, pp.279-289.
[3] Aron,R. Peace and War, p.5

relations between political units, each of which claims the right to take justice into its own hands and to be the sole arbiter of the decision to fight or not to fight.

The final part of the book is taken up with the question of how the international system has changed in the post 1945 era. In it Aron was interested in whether nuclear weapons have fundamentally changed strategic thinking about the role of force in foreign policy. On the other hand, he recognized that nuclear weapons were fundamentally different from conventional weapons in that their destructiveness, speed of delivery and limited utility required that they been used to deter war rather than fight one. For the first time in human history, nuclear armed states had the ability to destroy each other without having to defeat their opponent's armed forces (a condition of what has come to be called existential deterrence. Each has the ability to destroy the other totally in a retaliatory second nuclear strike, and the extreme sanction and fear of escalation were sufficient to deter each other ever embarking on a first strike. For Aron, this existential condition was secured as long as neither superpower could destroy the other's retaliatory capability in a nuclear attack, and as long as no iron-clad defense against nuclear weapons could be constructed. The effectiveness did not rely on complex strategies employed by either side to make the other certain of what would happen, should direct conflict break out between them. The credibility of deterrence lay in the weapons themselves, not in the attempts by states to think of nuclear war in conventional terms.

The greater stability there was in deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union, the less there was in the international system. The super powers themselves could be tempted to use conventional weapons in their proxy wars, unless this gave rise to fears

of escalation, the regional conflict would continue in the shadow of the nuclear standoff between the big two. Aron concluded that the Cold war was both unprecedented and in the context of the ideological differences between two superpowers armed with nuclear weapons, inevitable.

Despite, or rather because of the unprecedented dangers of the nuclear era, combined with the uncertainty that had always characterized international relations, Aron believed strongly in prudence as the most appropriate ethics of statecraft. By this he meant the need to substitute an ethics of consequences over assurance:

To be prudent is to act in accordance with the particular situation and the concrete data, and not in accordance with some system or out of passive obedience to a norm… it is to prefer the limitation of violence to the punishment of the presumably guilty party or to so called absolute justice; it is to establish concrete accessible objectives…and not limitless and perhaps meaningless (ones), such as "a world safe for democracy' or a world from which power politics has disappeared'(Aron,1968:585).

In short, Aron must be remembered as critics of Cold War excesses, and a moderate realism as a student of international relations, he altered the limits expected from theory. And to avoid either falling into a permanent cynicism utopian hopes for the transcendence of international relations.

3) George Kennan

George Kennan produced a stream of books and articles on US foreign policy, the history of the Soviet Union, and the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations during the Cold War. In much of his work he repudiates policies and practices implemented in the name of containment, a doctrine that will always be associated with his name. To understand his disillusionment with American foreign policy, one has to appreciate both the ways in which it departed from Kennan's vision, as well as Kennan's deeply felt regrets about the evolution of international politics from a European- centered multipolar system to a bipolar system based on the dominance of two nuclear superpowers.

In the 1940, Kennan argued that international stability depended upon a recreation of a multipolar order that had been destroyed by world war. In particular, he advocated that the United States should use its economic strength to help restore Europe and Japan as great powers, so that the burden of containing the Soviet threat could be shared rather than borne alone by a country that Kennan suspected was incapable of behaving in a moderate fashion abroad. As far as he was concerned, the aims of containment should have been limited to the defense and restoration of areas of crucial military industrial power. In terms of method, he insisted that the best way in which the United States achieves this was by offering economic aid to the war torn economics of Europe and Japan. This would enable them both to recover their status and to weaken the appeal of indigenous, radical or communist movements. He always believed that if the Soviet Union were geographically contained, its appeal to other states would diminish over time and it would undergo gradual internal changes that might transform its status from a revolutionary state to a more moderate great power.

In an incisive analysis written as the Cold War was fading into history, Richard Barnet identifies four crucial factors that account for the failure of the Truman administration to follow Kennan's advice (Barnet, 1992:113-127). First, the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly in the 1940s that inspired Truman to believe that nuclear weapons could be used to intimidate Stalin and achieve concrete concessions to American demands. Second, in the absence of any firm means of predicting Soviet foreign policy, the Truman administration relied heavily on the alleged lessons of history in 1930s, namely, the self defeating nature of appeasement in the face of authoritarian aggression. Although the Marshall plan was consistent with Kennan's emphasis on economic aid, he was horrified at the language used in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 which appeared to commit the United States to an open ended support of any regimes confronted with internal supervision supported by the Soviet Union. Third, the United States was very eager to strengthen Germany in a western alliance, and this required the presence of American troops on German soil as part of what to become NATO.

Kennan's original formulation of containment was in his view, distorted by the conflation of the Soviet threat with communism in general, the emphasis on military means rather than economic ones and the geographical expansion of the Cold War into Asia. But it would be wrong to argue that the subsequent history of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union fully bears out the validity of Kennan's original vision of containment. Certainly the Soviet Union, as he had predicted, did mellow over time and the dramatic policies followed by Gorbachev in the late 1980 testify to the inability of the Soviet Union to maintain its competition with the United States on a rapidly shrinking economic base.

Yet Kennan's take no pleasure from the ending of the Cold War, which in his view might have occurred many years prior to the late 1980 without the enormous costs of the nuclear arms race. Indeed the latter is an excellent example of the way in which US foreign policy had been distorted by an irrational fear that the Soviet Union might consider using nuclear weapons as rational means to expand its territory in Europe or engage in some form of nuclear blackmail.[4]

4) Hans Morgenthau

For Morgenthau, stability is a function of the ability and willingness of statesmen accurately to assess its character and then to work with the constraints that impose on their freedom of action abroad. This is particularly important in the post 1945 system, whose stability is threatened by historical changes that have made the new bipolar structure much more difficult to manage.

Morgenthau was very pessimistic about the capacities of the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain international stability. Although the struggle for power was kept within tolerable limits by mutual deterrence provided by nuclear weapons, he had no faith in their ability to maintain the stability. Since weapons were not the source of instability in the Cold War, neither could they be a cure[5].

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[4] Barnet, J. "A balance sheet: Lippmann, Kennan, and the Cold War,"pp.113-127
[5] Morgenthau, H. In Defence of the National Interest, p.91

5) Kenneth Waltz

In his book, <u>Theory of International Politics</u>,[6] balance of power politics prevail whenever two conditions are met, first, the order is anarchic. Second it has been be populated by units wishing to survive. Waltz argues that a bipolar structure dominated by two great powers is more stable than a multipolar structure dominated by three or more great powers. It is more likely to endure without system wide wars. He claims that there are striking differences between multipolarity and bipolarity in terms of strategic behavior. Under multipolarity, states rely on alliances to maintain their security. This is inherently unstable, since there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries.

In contrast the inequality between the superpowers ensures that the threat to each is easier to identify, and both the Soviet Union and the United States maintain the balance by relying on their own devises rather than allies. The dangers of miscalculation defection are thereby minimized. Nuclear deterrence, and the inability of either super power to overcome the retaliatory forces of the others, enhances the stability of the system.

<u>Liberals:</u>

1) Francis Fukuyama

In his book, <u>The End of History and the Last Man</u> (1992), Fukuyama believes that progress in human history can be measured by the elimination of global conflict and the international adoption of principles of legitimacy which have evolved over time in certain domestic political orders.

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[6] Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics, p.131

He is struck by the extent to which liberal democracies have transcended their violent instincts and institutionalized norms which pacify relations between each other. The translation of liberal democratic principles to the international realm is said to provide the best prospect for a stable world order, and because a world made up of liberal democracies, should have less incentive for war, since all nations recognize one another legitimacy. [7]

2) Michael. Doyle

Doyle also claims that democracies are unique in their ability and willingness to establish stable relations between themselves. This pacification of foreign relations among liberal states is said to be a direct product of shared legitimate political order based on democratic principles and institutions.

The reciprocal recognition of these common principles and a commitment to the rule of law, mean that democracies evince little interest in conflict with each other and have no grounds on which to contest each other's legitimacy. [8]

3) John. Mueller

As for Mueller, the obsolescence of major war in the twentieth century is the product of moral learning, a shift in ethical consciousness away from coercive forms of social behavior. Because war brings more cost than gains and is no longer seen as a romantic or

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[7] Fukuyama, F. The end of history and the last Man, p.243
[8] Doyle, M. Ways of War and Peace, pp.139-140

noble pursuit, it has become rationally unthinkable. His book Retreat from Doomsday [9] argued that the long stability between states is a cause of confident where war - as an instrument of international diplomacy - is becoming obsolete.

What distinguishes this research from others appears within the fact that this piece of work has specifically focused on examining the implications of nuclear deterrence on stability within theoretical-empirical analytical synthesis to envisage the extent to theoretical themes reflects empirical realities during the 1958-1968 Cold War era. The study recognizes that such significant particular period was chosen to characterize the most notable three crises occurred during the Cold War during which strong potentials for military nuclear confrontations of the Cold War were about to erupt.

I.VI. The Methodology of the Research

The thesis will be heavily pursuing descriptive and analytical approach based on historical foundations. Primary sources as well as secondary literatures – along with online availability- become the main source of information due to the nature of such investigation.

I.VII. The Results of the Research

Indeed, the advent of the nuclear weapons based on technological advancements (e.g. nuclear proliferation) altered the nature of the prevailing military and strategic thinking which as a result affected international politics. Hence, the concept of war as such has also changed in such a way that the dangers inherited in allowing conflict to escalate in the

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[9] Mueller, J. Retreat from Doomsday, P.33

nuclear era meant that war could no longer be viewed, as it has traditionally been. Technology and nuclear weapons played a critical role in strategic thinking, and raised the importance of strategic studies in dealing with nuclear weapons, and how to prevent the use of them. Since the advent of these weapons the relative importance of threat to use force has been raised in that it explains how nuclear deterrence as a concept took place and replaced wars.

In the same vein, nuclear deterrence is not a decision mechanism, but rather, it is a mean of deferring decisions, it can be seen as an effort to understand how political conflict of interest play out in the shadow of nuclear weapons. Such military hardware changed the strategic settings in which conflicts play out and as a result the explosion of nuclear weapons into international politics gave birth to two competing views of the weapons, theoretically growled in the long standing arguments about the consequences of military build-ups between nations within arms race competitions. First there was an argument maintains that arms race increased the chances of war, therefore a nuclear arm race could easily lead to nuclear war which revealed the policy of implication of this view, that advocating disarmament Second, there was the argument of nuclear deterrence in preventing conflict, which was the basis of policy for the nuclear states throughout the Cold War. Considering the fact that this dimension correspond to the area of interest of this research, the question is: Did nuclear deterrence trigger the state of non war and stability between the two super powers during the period of 1958-1968?

I.VIII. The Structure of the Research

As for the structure of the research, in total, the paper is composed of two main parts both of which contain four main chapters[10]. The first chapter (the theoretical chapter) will be subject to different areas conducive to the nature of the subject. In it, the first section will examine concepts such as the balance of power, balance of fear as a factor of avoiding wars. The second section however, will analyze theories of international relations particularly those which reflect the Cold War competition scenario between the two superpowers. To some extent, the chapter will also emphasize on the realist's school of thought, which deems the most prominent theory explaining the political nature as well as the strategic thinking of the two superpowers during the Cold War era.

The second chapter will discuss the role of technology and its vivid implications on nuclear weaponry enhancement. In it, the chapter will examine areas surrounding the definition as well as the history of the strategic studies (e.g. logic of deterrence). The third chapter (the empirical chapter) will discuss the Cold War era and examine those conditions that triggered the state of 'peace and stability' between the two rivalries in particular and internationally in general. Accordingly, the chapter presents some case-studies that shed the light and underline the above-mentioned conclusion. Accordingly, the chapter will expectedly try to answer several questions in terms of: what triggers crisis to erupt? And why do some crises escalate to war, while others do not? And how the decision-makers cope with the crisis and what are those critical turning points which influenced the decisions of policy makers during high tense periods? Given this, the thesis shall unleash

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[10] The first part (chapters one and two) is dedicated to the theatrical premises of the research whilst the second part (chapters three and four) is devoted to the empirical analysis examinations.

the significant role of nuclear deterrence played in these crises, and the extent it played in shaping international politics culminated with fostering 'stability' within the then continued mounting hazardous environment.

The fourth chapter (The Road to stability) will examine mainly the extent the empirical analysis coincides with the realist school of thought? However, it is worth noting here that although realism was the predominant theory that explains the case studies, this does not mean that liberalism failed completely to explain the above mention cases and the state of stability emerged. In the same vein, the chapter will also demonstrate how these strategic concepts were applied to the crisis that emerge between the two super powers, and to what extent these concepts triggered the state of peace and stability between the two rivalries in particular and internationally in general. Finally, the paper will sum up its main settings and arguments with a brief conclusion.

Part I: The Theoretical Framework

The main objective of this part of the research – which consists of two chapters - is to try to understand how the concept stability as such is understood within international relations and strategic thinking in chapter one and chapter two respectively. In short, as shown below, part I envisages that whereas first chapter discuss how international relations theories –with special reference to realism and liberalism school of thoughts - conceives stability per se can be achieved, the second chapter however discusses those strategic factors and/or instruments affecting the means and the pillars of military power conducive to stability (e.g. technology). Clearly, the outcomes deduced of the above-mentioned chapters shall lay the foundations to conduct a comparative analysis in chapter four to envisage the extent to which theoretical framework of the research coincides with the following empirical analysis (chapter three).

Chapter I

Understanding International Politics of Stability under Anarchy

I.I The Liberal-Realist Division

This chapter will shed the light on the key theoretical foundations of the relations between states in the international system under state of anarchy. In short, as shown in the following sections, it has been viewed that there are two main traditional schools of thoughts which remain to be salient today in dealing with such political circumstances: the liberalism and the realism school of thoughts.

I.II. Liberalism

The foundation of liberalism was laid in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in an attempt to propose preconditions for a stable world order (Burchill, 1996:31). Generally speaking, liberals view history as progressive, linear and directional as they believe that the progress in human history can be measured by the elimination of global conflict and the international adoption of principles of legitimacy which have evolved over time in certain domestic political orders (Fukuyama, 1992:48). This constitutes an inside out approach to international relations, where the exogenous behavior of states can be explained by examining their endogenous political and economic dispositions. It also leads to Doyle's claim that liberals are uniquely willing to eschew the use of force in their relations with one another (Linklater, 1993:29).

The spread of legitimate political orders will bring an end to international conflict; this argument assumes that states with liberal democratic credentials constitute a model which the rest of the world will emulate in that it transcend the violent instincts and the institutionalized norms which pacify the relations between each others. This progressive translation of liberal principles of the international realm will provide the best prospect for

a stable world order, and made states less incentive for war since all nations would recognize one another's legitimacy (Fukuyama, 1992: 48).

For liberals, peace and stability is the normal state of affairs. The laws of nature dictated harmony and co-operation between people; war therefore becomes either unnatural or irrational. They believe in progress and the perfectibility of the human condition. Through their faith in the power of human reason and the capacity of human beings to realize their inner potential, liberals remain confident that wars can be removed from human experience (Zacher and Matthew, 1995:107-50). They advocate that wars were created by undemocratic governments for their own vested interests. They were engineered by a fighter class bent on extending their power and wealth through territorial conquest, in order to provide governments with excuses to raise taxes, and to expand their bureaucratic machinery and increase their control over their citizens. The people on the other hand, were peace loving by nature, and only plunged into conflict by the whims of their deceiving rulers (Howard, 1978:31).Thus wars can be treated only by the twin medicines of democracy and free trade.

I.II.I. Elements of Stability for Liberalism
A) Free Trade and Commerce

Liberals believed that the spirits of war and commerce were mutually incompatible. Most wars were fought by states to achieve their mercantilist goals. Free trade however, was an effective and stable means of achieving national wealth due to the theory of comparative advantage, each economy would be better off than if it had been pursuing self sufficiency (Burchill and linklater, 1996:35).

Free trade would break the divisions between states and unite individuals everywhere in one community, the artificial barriers to commerce distort relations between individuals and therefore, causing international conflict. On the contrary free trade would expand the range of contacts and level of communication between the peoples and encourage international friendship and understanding. The unimpeded commerce between the peoples of the world would unite them in a common peaceful and stable enterprise. Therefore, trade would increase the wealth and power and bring men of different nations into constant contact with one another (Howard, 1978:20).

Democratic processes and institutions would break the power of the ruling elites and limit their tendency for violence. Free trade and commerce would overcome the artificial barriers between individuals and unite them everywhere into one community (Burchill, 1996:33). It will break down the divisions between states and unite individuals in one community binned together by one common tie of interest and intercourse the universal society of nations throughout the civilized world (Ricardo, 1911:114).

Conflicts were cause by states erecting barriers which distorted the natural harmony of interests shared by individuals across the world. The solution to this problem will be through the free movement of commodities, capital and labor, and through the spread of markets that will place societies on an entirely new foundation. Therefore, trade would create relations of mutual dependence which would foster understanding between peoples and reduce conflict (Burchill, 1996:37).

Liberals also perceive plenty of opportunities for cooperation and broader notions of power like cultural capital. They also assume that states can make absolute gains through cooperation and interdependence—thus peace and stability are possible in the system. One primary hope of liberals for stability is the democratic peace concept. The main propositions of this concept is: peace and stability through the expansion of democratic institutions; populations of states focus naturally on their economic and social welfare as opposed to imperialistic militarism; the subordination of states to an international legal system; and commitment to collective security enhances stability. Perhaps the most important element of the democratic peace concept is the belief that liberal democratic states are likely to remain at peace with one another. The international judicial system, combined with the perceived economic and social success of liberal states, normally dictates avoidance of external conflict, especially with another liberal democratic state (Doyle, 1986:1157).

B) Diplomacy and Collective Security

Liberals advocate for democracy because they are doubtful of the concentrated forms of power, especially state power. When they approach international system, liberals conceive power being exercised in the interests of governing elites and against the wishes of the masses. Secret diplomacy was the name they use to describe the behavior of unrepresentative elites and their practices in international relations in the pre-democratic era.

They disputed with the view that foreign policy was a specialized art which was made by professional diplomats behind closed doors and away from the influences of national

politics. If the democratization of domestic politics could produce important economic and social reforms there would be a balanced improvement in the conduct of foreign policy as a result of popular participation (Clark, 1989:147-148).

Furthermore, liberals perceives balance of power as the most destructive aspect of secret diplomacy, since it was the product of elite conspiracy which resulted in international relations being arranged to suit the interests of those who ruled great powers (Haward, 1978:43). Also, according to their point of view, balance of power was the veil behind which the armaments industries enriched themselves through state expenditure on weapons of war (Gobden, 1992:208-9). They advocate that balance of power had failed to prevent wars, because great power had locked themselves into two aggressive blocs instead of allowing for the flexibility of realigning each other against the aggressor. Collective security was designed to replace balance of power and make it institutional. For liberals this would have two useful results: first it would make the balance of power more effective because there would be fewer chance of a preponderant power emerging. Secondly, it would ensure that violence would always be used in a legitimate manner (Clarck, 1989:23).

Collective security was an attempt by the liberals to support their view that stability depend on the spread of democracy, and on the processes of domestic law at the international level. Liberals believed that the destructive forces of international anarchy could be brought to an end only if the international system was regulated as domestic society (Giddens, 1985:258). For instance, liberals considered that the League of Nations that was designed as an over arching authority which would regulate the behavior of states toward each other. Hence, their members would submit their disputes to arbitration, and if necessary using sanctions

to compel aggressor states to conform to a peaceful method of conflict resolution. Under the organization's rules, an act of war against one member of the league would be considered an act of aggression against the entire international community. The league would be run by an alliance of major powers permanently committed to opposing aggression on the grounds of principle. In this respect, President Wilson of the US maintained that, "there must be not a balance of power but a community of power, not organized rivalries but an organized common peace" (Mckinaly, 1986:186).

In short, liberals advocate that the prospects for stability and the elimination of war are due to a number of key factors such as cooperation and mutual interests, a preference for democracy over elimination of war or/and a preference for democracy over aristocracy along with free trade over autarky, and most importantly collective security over the balance of power system (Burchill and Linklater, 1996: 31).

After reviewing the liberal perspective, the following section will discuss in general terms realism paradigm to try to envisage how this school of thought envisages international stability can be sustained.

I.III. Realism

Realism is widely regarded as the most influential theoretical tradition in international relations, even by its harshest critics. Its ancient philosophical heritage and its influence on the practice of international diplomacy have secured it an important, if not dominant position in the discipline (Burchill and linklaler, 1996:67).

Realism generally tries to explain both the behavior of individual states and the characteristics of the international system as a whole. For realism the sovereign states are the constitutive components of the international system (Krasner, 1992:39). Relations among those states take place in the absence of world government. For realists, this means that the international system is anarchical. Anarchy is a self help system in which political entities are responsible for their own survival. If a state is attacked, it has to defend itself with whatever affordable means. There is no authoritative agency can be called on to resolve disputes between states, leaders find necessary to threaten the use of force or to employ it. Whereas its importance varies from era to era, military power nonetheless remains a decisive factor in the making and the shaping of interstate relations and international politics (Buzan, 1987:6).

In anarchy, force is integral to foreign policy because military power can be wielded not only forcefully buy also "peacefully". The forceful use of military power is physical. A state harms, cripples, or destroy the possessions of another state. The peaceful use of military power is intimidating: a state threatens to harm, destroy but does not do so (Waltz and Art, 1999: 3). To use military power forcefully is to wage war, to use it peacefully is to threaten to war. In a hope war can be avoided threats are usually made. For any state, war is the exception in its relation with other states, because most of the time a given state is at peace, not war. Consequently, states use their military power more frequently in the peaceful than in the forceful mode (Ibid, 3).

Relations amongst independent actors always contain the possibility of conflict over political, economic, and social issues, and sometimes these conflicts will result in the use of

force (Buzan, 1987:6). Conflict between states was inevitable in an international system without an overarching authority regulating relations between them. The absence of a compulsory jurisdiction for states-an anarchical international system confirmed the principle distinction between domestic and international politics. In the international system there are no equivalent regulatory systems which can enforce compliance on states. There is no binding international law or legal system which can bring states to account for their behaviors. States can get away with whatever their power allows them to achieve (Carr, 1939:279).

Unlike liberalism, they believe that there is no natural harmony of interests between states in the international system, only a contemporary and transient reflection of a particular configuration of global power. War may in fact be the only way in which power can be recalibrated in the international system (Burchill and linklaler, 1996:70). Common interests between states, if they are to emerge, must be artificially harmonized by state action (Ibid, 66). The pursuit of national power was a natural drive which states neglected at their peril. Nation states which eschewed the pursuit of power on principle simply endangered their own security. Moreover, the pursuit of power by individual states took the form of promoting national interests, a term later to be more broadly defined as the foreign policy goals of the nation but understood by realists to specifically mean strategic power.

Clashes of national interests were inevitable: it was futile and dangerous to suggest otherwise. The only way to minimize such clashes was to ensure that a rough balance of power existed between the states in the international system (Carr, 1939:77). To put it in another way, the best safeguard against international conflict was the prevention of one

stable emerging with preponderant power. Far from being a cause of international conflict, the balance of power system resembled the laws of nature: that was the normal expression of international power and the best guarantee of stability (Burchill and linklaler, 1996:71).

According to one of the most prominent advocate of realism, Hans Morgenthau, who argues that realists make four basic assumptions about international relations:

A) Politics is governed by objective laws which have their root in human nature: These laws do not change over time and are resistant to human preference. A rational theory of politics and international relations can be based on these laws; these laws provide us with certainty and confidence in predicting national political behavior (Morgenthau, 1948:3)

B) The key to understanding international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power: Reference to this concept enables us to see politics as an autonomous sphere of action. It imposes intellectual discipline and infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible (Morgenthau, 1948:3). The idea of interest defined in terms of power reveals the true behavior of politicians and guards against two popular misconceptions about what determines a state's foreign policy- the motives of statesmen and ideological preferences.

While political leaders will cast their policies in ideological terms, they are inevitably confronted by the distinction between what is desirable and is actually possible. There is no place for ethical concerns, Political philosophy or individual preference in the determination of foreign policy because actions are constrained by the relative power of the

state. The national interest which ought to be the sole pursuit of statesmen is always defined in terms of strategic and economic capability.

C) The forms and nature of state power will vary in time, place and context but the concept of interest remains consistent, the political, cultural and strategic environment will largely determine the forms of power a state chooses to exercise, just as the types of power which features in human relationships change over time: Realists ought not to be wedded to a permanent connection between interest and the nation state which is a product of history, and therefore bound to disappear. The present division of the political will be replaced by larger units of quite different character, with the keeping of the technical potentialities and moral requirements of the contemporary world. Changes in the international system, however, will occur through the workman like manipulation of the perpetual forces that have shaped the past as they will the future ((Morgenthau, 1948:12).

D) Universal moral principles do not guide state behavior, though state behavior will certainly have moral and ethical implications: Individuals are certainly influenced by moral codes, but states are not moral agents. Any attempt to explain the international behavior of states should not concentrate on the stated moral principles which are considered to underpin the conduct of foreign policy. Political behavior is evaluated according to the political consequences, whereas ethical behavior is judged according to whether it conforms to a set of moral principles (Ibid, 12).

E) There is no universally agreed set of moral principles: Though states from time to time will endeavor to clothe their behavior in ethical terms, the use of moral language to justify

external behavior is designed to grant advantage, legitimacy and further the national interest of the state. Universal moral principles are not a reliable guide to state behavior. When states proclaim these universal principles, they are simply foretelling their particular national or cultural codes onto the world as a whole (Ibid, 5).

F) The political sphere is autonomous from every other sphere of human concern, whether they are legal, moral or economic: This enables us to see the international domain as distinct from other fields of intellectual inquiry, with its standards of thought and criteria for the evaluation of state behavior (Ibid, 5).

International relations are best understood by focusing on the distribution of power among states. Despite their formal legal equality, the uneven distribution of powers means that the arena of international relations is a form of power politics. Power is hard to measure; its distribution among states changes over time and there is no consensus among states about how it should be distributed.

International relations are therefore a realm of necessity (states must seek power to survive in a competitive environment) and continuity over time. When realists contemplate change in the international system, they focus on changes in the balance of power among states; in tend to discount the possibility of fundamental change in the dynamics of the system itself. In fact there is a sharp disagreement over the relative qualities of particular balances of power (unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity). There is also much debate over the casual relationship between states and the international pressures upon them, and the relative

importance of different kinds of power in contemporary international relations (Griffiths, 1999:2).

I.III.I The Exercise of Power

As mentioned before, for realists, power is a core concept of international politics. To understand the two most fundamental international political phenomena -Stability and War –theorists of realism often focus on the distribution of power among states. Many of them explain the stability and war in international politics are determined by power relationships among states. Many realist scholars agree that the power relationship is a vital factor in analyzing stability and war among states: but the debate of whether stability is best maintained by equally distributed power or preponderant power is not fully resolved. As Kugler said" balance of power theory and power preponderance theory are in rivalry within realist tradition" (Kugler, 1993) these two theories give us totally different interpretations about the relationship between power distribution and stability.

According to Power Preponderance theory, the international system is organized to the dominant country's advantage, reflecting its power preponderance. Organski, who is considered as one of the scholars of the preponderance theory defended that "we have seen that there were periods when an equal distribution of power between contenders…. these periods…were periods of war, not peace" (Organski, 1958, 293). Robert Keohane (1980) similarly provides a parallel viewpoint, he says that the stability of international regimes rely on a preponderant power that can make and maintain rules and norms of international behavior among countries n the regime. These scholars explain causes of war differently

from balance of power theorists. They argue that preponderance leads to stability, while the absence of preponderant power may be associated with instability.

Many empirical evidences have been found to support either side of the academic debate, as well as to support a view that there is no relationship between power distribution and stability (Hanseung, 2001: 2). There is another debate of power which maintains that whereas debate of power distribution and stability is associated with how power has an influence on the behavior of states, the second issue of power is related to the concept of power itself. The concept of power has been explained in many ways. To compare the power difference between America and Soviet Union for example, people often use numbers of submarines, or number of ICBMs, but if someone is asked to compare Japanese and German power to their GNPs levels, or to the automobile industry. However, some features of power, such as culture and religion are not visible, and therefore, are not easily measurable in a numerical way. For example, the state of Vatican has no missile capabilities, but its religious power is huge in the Catholic societies all over the world (Hanseung, 2001: 2).

As mentioned before the concept of power is explained in various ways not only because it is composed of many factors, such as military expenditure, industrial capacity, and educational level, but also because it is exercised in different ways. The most widespread explanations of power exercise are the Dahlian explanation (1957) which regards power relations as casual relations. Dahlian defines power in terms of A had power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. In other words, one who exercises power always has its own will, (Dahl, 1957: 201-215). In this respect,

Dahlain explanation of power exercise concludes that power as such is determinant of the outcome (Ward, 1989:4).

However, such Dahlian explanation of power exercise has problems in some cases, because this definition judged the power relationship only by its outcome. Other balance of power theorists have different definition for power, such as Steven Lukes that define power as a three-dimensional power, which operates to shape and modify desires and believe. In unequal power relations, the week has few opportunities to bring its preferable issue for an agenda. In spite of this inequality, the weak often does not reveal any grievance even though the stronger sets an agenda against objective interests of the week, this is because the week redefines its own interests coinciding with those of the strong in advance (Lukes,1986:10).

Other scholars like Joseph Nye's defines power as the ability to shape what others want, and differentiates it from command power, which is" the ability to change what others do" (Nye, 1990b:177-192). While others pay attention to third dimensional features of power, such as Bachrach and Baratz they both argue that the power relationship between the strong and the week influences the calculation of preferences of the latter in the process of agenda setting (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962:947-952).

In sum, Dahlian behavioralism explains exercise of power as a causal relation. In this view, power relations can be captured only when power is exercised by the will of the holder. Accordingly, in order to determine this will, some factors are needed to be taken into consideration in order to respond to this paradox mainly by distinguishing between two

groups of elements: those which are relatively stable, and those which are subject to constant change (Morgenthau, 1954:107). As for the formal, there several factors constitute this category such as geography, natural resources[11], though due to the area of interest of this research, the chapter will focus chiefly on the geographical component. As for the latter, the category consists of: technology, population, military preparedness, leadership, and quality of armed forces. For similar purpose mentioned above, the chapter will focus mainly on the technological as well as military preparedness dimensions.

A) Stable Factors

1. **Geography**: The most stable factor upon which the power of a nation depends is geography. The fact that the continental territory of the United States is separated from other continents by bodies of water, three thousand miles wild to the east and more than six thousand miles wide to the west is a permanent factor that determines the position of the United States in the world. The importance of this factor today is not what it was in the times of George Washington or President McKinley. But it is misleading to assume as it is frequently done that the technical development of transportations, communications and warfare has eliminated the isolating factor of the oceans. This factor is much less important today than it was fifty or a hundred years ago, but it still makes a lot of difference from the point of view of the power position of the United States. It is separated from the continents of Europe and Asia by wide expenses of water instead of bordering (Morgenthau, 1967: 107). This geographical location of the United States remains a fundamental factor of

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[11] Natural resources: natural resources are other stable factor that exerts an important influence upon the power of a nation with respect to others. Food, raw materials, and industrial capacity, are the most elemental of these resources.

permanent importance which the foreign policies of all nations must take into account; however different it's bearing upon political decisions might be today from what it was in other periods of history. As for the geographical situation of the Soviet union, it constitutes an enormous (Land mass) that extends over one seventh of the land area of the earth and is two and one half times as large as the territory of the united states, while its about five thousand miles by air from the Bering's traits to Koenigsberg. This territorial extension is a permanent source of great strength which has thus for frustrated all attempts at military conquest from the outside (Ibid, 108).

The possibility of nuclear war has enhanced the importance of the size of territory as a source of national power. For the nuclear threat to be credible, a nation requires a territory large enough to disperse its industrial and population Centers as well as its nuclear installation. The conjunction between the large radius of nuclear destruction and the relatively small size of their territories impose a severe handicap upon the ability of the traditional nation states, such as France and Britain to make a nuclear threat credible. Thus it is the quasi continental size of their territory which allows the United States and the Soviet Union to play the role of major nuclear weapons. On the contrary there are some geographical factors that constitutes at the same time the weakness for the international position of the Soviet union, which is the absence of high mountains or broad stream that separate the soviet union from its west neighbors and that the plains of Poland and eastern Germany from a natural continuation of the Russian plain, was a factor of a permanent source of conflict between Russia and the west (Ibid, 108). As shown in chapter three, the geographical proximity played a significant role in escalating the Cuban Crises between the US and the USSR.

B) Instable Factors

1. Technology

The twentieth century has witnessed four major innovations in the technique of warfare. First, the submarine was used in the First World War by Germany against British shipping. Second, the tank was used by the British which give the allies one of their assets for victory. Third, strategic and tactical coordination of the air force and naval forces contributed to the German and Japanese superiority in the initial stages of the Second World War. Fourth, nations which possess nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them have an enormous technological advantage over their competitors (Morgenthau, 1994: 116).

However, the availability of nuclear weapons resulted in two main paradoxes stem mainly from the destructiveness of the nuclear weapons. The first paradox is attributed to the destructiveness caused by quantity increases in nuclear advancements in contrast to conventional ones does not signify an increase in national power. Once a nation possesses nuclear weapons necessary to destroy enemy's target it has chosen for destruction, taking all the possible contingencies, such as the first strike by the enemy into consideration therefore, additional nuclear weapons will not increase the nation's power.

The second paradox revolves around the inverse relationship between the degrees of destructiveness of nuclear weapon sands their rational instability. High yield nuclear weapons are instruments of indiscriminate mass destruction, and cannot be used for rational

military purposes. They can be used to deter a war by threatening total destruction; but they cannot be used to fight a war in a rational manner (Morgenthau, 1994: 116).

2. Technology, Military Preparedness and the Quality of Armed Forces

What gives the factor of geography, natural resources, and industrial capacity their actual importance for the power of a nation is military preparedness, it needs a military establishment capable of supporting the foreign policies pursued; such ability derives from technology, leaderships, and the quantity and quality of the armed force, and technology. The powers of a nation in military terms depend on the quality of men and arms and their destruction among the different branches of the military establishment. To be strong, a nation must possess a large army, it may have high level of technology, but its military leaders may excel in the strategy and tactics appropriate to the new techniques of war, such a nation is politically and military weak, if it does not possess a military establishment that in its over-all strength and in the strength of its components parts is neither too large nor too small in view of the tasks it may be called upon to perform (Ibid, 119)

After discussing power and its elements, and knowing that the aspiration for power on the part of several nations each trying either to maintain or over throw the status quo, this leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and policies that aim at preserving it. The balance of power is an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations, and the instability of the international balance of power is due to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in a society of sovereign nations rather than the faultiness of the principle it self. As shown below, it appears that

despite interests and ideologies differences between superpowers, the notion of balance of power contributed in a stabilizing atmosphere between the East and West Blocks.

But before discussing the Balance of power concept, and its attribution for preserving the peace and stability in the societies, we must begin with the definition of the concept itself as a universal one.

I.I.IV. Balance of Power

In general terms, the balance of power theory proposes that states band together and pool their capabilities whenever one state or group of states appear to be gathering a disproportionate amount of power, in order to threaten or dominate their opponent counterparts totally or partially (Viotti and Kauppi,1987:51).

Therefore, balance of power theorists argue that maintaining a power balanced among states is the most decisive factor of avoiding wars. When power is dispersed, the likelihood of War is lower than that when a power is highly concentrated. In terms of the number of major actors, however, the balance of power theory camp is divided into two groups. Kenneth Waltz (1964) for instance, argues that a bipolar system is much more stable because multi-polarity makes uncertainty and the probability of war will be greater. On the other hand, classical balance of power theorists make the opposite argument. They believe that a multi-polar system is more conductive to stability because uncertainty breeds caution on the part of decision makers (Deutsch, Karl, and Singer, 1964: 390-406). Although the scholars of the balance of power theory camp diverge in arguments, but they share a belief that power distribution leads to stability and if countries succeeded in keeping equality in

power acquisition, they could avoid war, because war is least likely if power is distributed unequally (Hanseung, 2001: 3). And because of this belief, states implemented different methods of the balance of power in order to avoid war and attain stability such as: Divide and Rule, Compensation, Armaments, and Alliances.

Despite the different interpretations over the type of methods that explain the nature of the balance of power between the superpowers during the Cold War, the notion of balance of power as such played a crucial role in preventing a third war between USA and USSR during the Cold War culminated with fostering the role of the notion of deterrence within continued growing of technological revolution. The following section will try to envisage how this school of thought assumes international stability can be sustained.

I.I.V. Realism and Stability within Balance of Power Perspective

Realism is concerned with the reproduction of the international system of states. It uses notions of order, stability, deterrence and the balance of power, to convey its message of constraint and to reify the structure of the international system (Thompson, 1990:65).

Realism is an equilibrium theory of stability. Such notion of stability however, is maintained by the working of the balance of power which emerges from the constant preparation for war and adjustments to shifts in capability. If the system worked smoothly war would be avoided, and War thus is an anomaly, both the perturbation of the equilibrium and departures from it are exogenous to the realism. Alliances, too are an anomaly and unnecessary if they depend only on joint interests. Realism must perforce

explain War by the failure of the system to return smoothly to equilibrium, and most explain alliances through the inadequacy of convergent interests to deter (Stein, 2002: 1).

Although, it seems sarcastic to describe realism as a theory of stability since it is allocated as an intolerant, roughly realistic theory of conflict and the primacy of power in international relations. The modern history of realism and the emphasis on the primacy of power politics lies in the World War II and the desire to explain aggression, expansion and war. Such outcomes gave realists their label and dubbed their intellectual opponents as idealists, generating an image of the liberals who believed in the possibility of world stability through international agreements, organizations and law. In the contrary, realists emphasized on the existence of conflicts of interest and the primacy of state concerns with power (Kagan, 1969:223-37).

Interest in the balance of power, however, has a much older pedigree, and twentieth-century theorists credit Thucydides as the first realist who explains the origins of the Peloponnesian War in the growth of Athenian power (Seabury, 1965). International relations theorists also point to a number of important political theorists who wrote directly on the balance of power, including Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau (Sullivan, 1973:258-70).

Neorealist also wrote about the balance of power, for example, the balance of power according to them is seen in terms of an equilibrium stable state (Chatterjee, 1975:70). States are presumed to be simply interested in self- preservation that respond to adverse shifts in the global balance of power (Rosecrance, 1961:222-31), any perturbation in the

balances of power generates reactions that return the system to balance. What disturbs any balance is considered outside the theory.

This formulation is precisely the same as that of equilibrium arguments in other fields (Russett, 1966) the theory characterizes the forces that maintain any system or structure in some equilibrium state. Those forces that disturb the equilibrium are considered exogenous shocks that cannot be explained within the theory.

Waltz's balance of power argument mirrors this equilibrium specifically and self-deliberately. Waltz grants that disturbances to any balance of power are originate at the level of the individual, nation states, technological breakthroughs, and individual madmen. These disturbances cannot be explained by any international systems theory. Neo- realism, like any equilibrium theory has admitted the weakness of exogeneity. What disturb the equilibrium is simply outside the scope of the model (Mearsheimer, 1990:5-56).

Waltz describes neorealism as a systemic theory in which each state's search for security in an anarchic environment generates conflict and competition. He argues that "although neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain war's dismal recurrence through the millennia" a recurrence which" is explained by the structure of the system (Waltz, 1988:620). In an anarchic realm, stability is fragile, since the balance can be disturbed, maintaining that stability requires that states respond to perturbations and that the equilibrium be quickly and readily restored. It is the failure of the system to re equilibrate that is the cause of War. If the system were functioning correctly, and states

immediately responded to changes in the distribution of power, then stability would be maintained (Ibid, 620).

Realism was harshly criticized for not having predicted or being able to explain the end of the Cold War. The realism defense against this charge is simply that the implosion of the Soviet Union was an exogenous shock. It was rooted in domestic politics and economics that were outside the scope of the theory. But what realism can explain only is the resulting return to equilibrium (Mearsheimer, 1990:5-56).

The theory does, however, explain the consequences that attend them. Perturbations in the balance generate responses by individual nation-states that result in a return to an equilibrium balance of power. Scholars have quite self-consciously rooted modern international relations theory, including recent strains of balance of power thinking, in economics (Waltz, 1990:21-37). In the competitive international system, market structures the analogue for international system structure. Just as markets constrain firms international systems constrain states. The competitive market presumes many players, none of whom have market power, all of whom must perforce respond to the dictates of the market. This is precisely what makes the theory structural. Yet the structural approach to international relations typically focuses on a small set of great powers. This is more akin not to the competitive market in economics but to an oligopolistic market; and in the latter, structure is in determinant.

Paradoxically, therefore, the economics similarity for international relations should have resulted in an argument about structural indeterminacy as regards the great powers.

Following from the economics similarity, the argument should be that the international system forces particular responses upon small states and not upon great powers. Realists typically ignore small states because they are least relevant for setting the stage of international politics. But that is because they are indeed the security "price takers" that the economics analogue would suggest. In contrast, great powers are security "price makers" and at least constrained by the international system. There is a special irony in the realist argument, that bipolar systems are more stable and more readily sustained in a bipolar world (Waltz1964:881-909).In the bipolar world each great power recognizes from where threats emanate, monitors the relevant other, and responds immediately to actions taken by the other. In contrast, a multipolar world with more than two great powers is one of grater uncertainty. States are uncertain which one of them is threatened by the incremental growth of one (Maurseth, 1964:125). This uncertainty explains the greater War-proneness of multipolar worlds than of bipolar ones; therefore, the working of the balance of power is affected by the uncertainty in a multipolar world. The analogy with economics also would suggest the duopolistic systems may as readily result in collusion rather than all out competition. A structural realism analogizing from economics should have suggested that bipolarity may result in a strategic condominium between two superpowers. An unstated assumption in the realist argument about bipolarity in particular, therefore, is that collusion is excluded as a possible outcome (Kaplan, 1958:329-34).

The balance-of-power equilibrium that emerges from a competitive international system is a kin to the working of the visible hand in the price system. For economists, the interaction o f individual greed in a competitive market place results through the visible hand in the counter- intuitive result of the lowest prices for all goods. Individual greed results in

maximum collective welfare. Similarly, in international relations, the rapaciousness of some states and the fears of others lead to an intense concentration on power and force, which results in the stable balance of power (Taylor, 1954: 9).

Given this, realism for many is viewed as not a theory of war at all. It is a theory of peace and stability and this connection was explicit in earlier writing. Daniel Defoe, writing at the beginning of the 18[th]century wrote," a just balance of power is the life of peace" (Maurseth, 1964:29). That's why the balance of power can explain the constant readiness to use and threaten force, but not the actual resort to force. If the balance of power worked as advertised, there will be no War. Perturbations in the balance should be small and generate the pressures that return the system to a stable equilibrium balance of power.

This is the way in which to interpret the characterization of the international state of nature as a state of War. It is a world in which states constantly prepare for War, in which" force remains the final arbiter" (Waltz, 1997:180), and in which there is an "omnipresent threat of War" (Doyle, 1990:224). In explaining a state of War, realism also explains the occurrence of War. But in this equilibrium state of War, actual War should not break out. The use of phrases such as state of War has obscured that fact that realism is a theory of peace and stability based on the constant preparation for War and not a theory of War at all.

In short, stability under realism can be achieved through the working of the balance of power and predominance of power whilst liberalism foresee stability through cooperation between nations based on mutual interests and confidence building measures. Indeed, as shown in chapter four, balance of power, based technological advancements and rivalries

between the two superpowers then, triggered the efficacy of deterrence within which the state of stability was attained.

I.I.VI. The Arms Race

As mentioned before, states coexist in a condition of anarchy. If a state is attacked, it has to defend itself with whatever affordable means. Anarchy compels states to arm themselves in order to feel secure (Waltz and Art, 1999: 3). The arm race is increasingly a world wild phenomenon and although its intensity varies clearly between regions, few countries have stayed out of it (Thee, 1981:97).

There have been several attempts to define arm racing. Steiner, for example defines it as repeated, competitive, and reciprocal adjustments of their war-making capacities between two nations or two sets of nations (Steiner, 1973:5). Huntington defines it as a progressive, competitive peace time increase in armaments by two states or coalitions of states resulting from conflicting purpose of mutual fears (Huntington, 1958,:41). Bull defines it as intense competition between opposed powers or groups of powers, each trying to achieve an advantage in military power by increasing the quantity or improving the quality of its armaments or armed forces (Bull, 1961:5).

All of these definitions suggest that arms racing is an abnormally intense condition in relations between states reflecting either or both of active political rivalry, and mutual fear of the other's military potential. The problem with the concept is how to distinguish this abnormal condition from the norm of self defense behavior under condition of anarchy (Buzan, 1987:70).

Although arms racing is a central concept in strategic thinking, ambiguity about the boundary between normal and abnormal conditions makes it one of the least well understood, and most widely misused, opinion about it is highly divided, Some scholars find the term so vague and problematic that they advocate avoiding it as far as possible (Bellany,1975:129).The preference to reject the term stems from the lack of any agreed understanding about what it means, and partly from the politicization of its negative image by those campaigning against militarism. The vagueness of the term makes it applicable to the whole process by which states maintain military capability. Its negative connotations make it politically useful as a broad brush with which to degrade the entire process of national defense. Political usage of the term encourages broad interpretation, and so makes it difficult to use any accuracy even when a brief definition is offered (Buzan, 1987:70).

 The other extreme strands a large body of opinion that sees arm racing a fundamental dilemma of the whole attempt to seek national security through military means (Thompson and Smith, 1980:70). Many who take this view argue that arm race have preceded that last two World Wars, and there are widespread fears that the contemporary race seen to be going on between the super powers is the build up to a third World War.

Arms racing are seen as a dangerous phenomenon need to study, and a problem in need of remedy, and a basis for taking a critical view of the whole strategic approach to international relations (Buzan, 1987:70).Regardless of whether one embraces the concept or rejects it, arm racing lies at the heart of what Strategic Studies is about: the way the instruments of force affect relations among the states that possess them. This centrality is

evinced by the fact that arms racing connects to so many of the main subjects within Strategic Studies. Arm racing is indivisible from the broader subject of military technology that occupies so much of the contemporary strategic literature (Howard, 1985:2-3). Arm racing connects also to subjects outside Strategic Studies such as economic development. In as much as arm racing is about the political, and not just the military. It also has important lines of contact with work in the broader field of international relations (Waltz, 1979, 71).

As mentioned before that the Idea of a race suggests two or more states engaged in a competition to accumulate military strength against each other. It also suggests that winning is the object of the exercise in terms of one parity achieving decisive change in the balance of military power. Much of the literature is about the process by which states create armed forces and keep their equipment up to date. The competition involved in this process may not be exhausting, and the objective may not be crucial victory (Buzan, 1983:194-6). Because of this competition, some new terms need to be adopted. Such as the term that describes the normal condition of military relations in an anarchic system. Finding that term, leads us to another term that describes the whole phenomenon including both normal behavior and arm racing (Thee, 1986:98).

The term arms dynamic, is used to refer to the whole set of pressures that make states both acquire armed forces and change the quality and quantity of the armed forces they already possess. While the term arm racing is reserved for the most extreme manifestation of the arm dynamic; when the pressures are such as to lead states into major competitive expansions of military capability. The term maintenance of the military status quo is used to express the normal operation of the arm dynamic. Maintenance of the military status quo

and arm racing can be used to describe the activity of a single state, or the character of a relationship between two or more states (Huntington, 1958:41-42). Arm racing and maintenance of the military status quo relate to each other as extremes of spectrum. Maintenance of the military status quo can escalate into arm racing, and arm racing can subside into maintenance of the military status quo (Huntington, 1958:41-42).

Because arms racing and maintenance of the military status quo are manifestations of the same over-all arms dynamic, they share many characteristics, and differ more in degree than in kind. On the basis of these definitions, what is needed in order to clarify the subject is a model of the arm dynamic as a whole. Most of the attempts to understand arms racing have been made in terms of models of the process that include states to increase their military strength, these two models can be applied to the arms dynamic as a whole. These models are the action-reaction model and the domestic structure model (Thee, 1986:16-20)

The action reaction model: is the most common explanation of the arms race, driven by rivalry for territory and wealth (Thee, 1978:98). It stems from the anarchic political structure of the international system: each state is a potential threat to others, and each has to take measures to secure its own survival. Anarchy at the level of the international system is a form of political relations that tends to produce military competition among states along action-reaction lines. When the competition reflect power struggle between states, as before world Wars, it can be intense and highly focused. Power struggles reflect an attempt by states to increase their influence and control in the international system at the expense other well entrenched. They are likely to produce arms race in which the revisionist states

hope to change their status either by winning the race without fighting, or by building up their military strength for a war with the status quo power (Buzan, 1978:77).

The domestic structure model: rests on the idea that the arms dynamics is generated by forces within the state, seeking to explain the behavior of states in terms of their domestic structures and affairs. This model argues that the arm dynamic has become so deeply institutionalized within each state that domestic factors largely displace the basic forms of action and reaction as the main engine of the arms dynamic. The external factor of rivalry still provides the necessary motivation for the arms dynamic. But when reactions are anticipatory, the particularities of military funding, procurement and technology are determined from within the state (Russeltt, 1983b:86-96).

In short, the above-mentioned chapter is highly significant in that it analyzed power, its components, and its characteristics towards achieving stability from different perspective. Indeed, as shown below, the overall determinant factor that governed US – Soviet relations on one hand and stability in other are highly conditioned by power whilst stability as such is best maintained by the form of equally distributed power more than the form of preponderant power. Technology is nonetheless becomes critical factor in shaping power for both parties within which deterrence based on balance of power eventually triggered stability during the Cold War (nuclear deterrence will further be examined in following chapter). To this end, and after discussing how theories conceive how stability can be achieved (first chapter), the following (second) chapter however will further focus with those strategic factors and/or instruments affecting the means and the pillars of military power conducive to stability.

Chapter II

Understanding Stability within Strategic Studies Perspective

The main purpose of this chapter is to draw a brief analysis of the historical developments of strategic studies in order to understand the significance component of strategic studies and its implications on stability amongst nations in particular and international relations on the whole. In turn, the chapter will specifically attempt to lay the ground for the following chapters to unleash the cover around those strategic instruments that affected the settings of the inter-state relations particularly between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Thus, the chapter will focus at two main turning points – which are presented into two separate sections- within the course of historical developments of strategic studies: first, the significant role of nuclear technology on the one hand and deterrence on the other as step towards understanding their direct overall implications on international stability and secondly, to understand the key role of strategic thinking – with special reference to the concept of deterrence as a key strategic variable- and its association with the issue of stability.

Indeed, highly developed technology played a major role in boosting the efficacy of arms race and balance of power and as a result have had triggered an efficient deterrence mechanism during the Cold War within which stability - of non confrontational war - between superpowers was established.

Introduction

From the dawn of modern history to the mid-twentieth century, relations between states were conducted in an atmosphere darkened by the ever present possibility of violence. Although moral conceptions imposed some restraints on the actions of statesmen, in the absence of a world government and firm moral consensus, issues could rarely be settled solely by appeals to reason and justice. Coercion was the only means of resolving disputes, and because the resort to force could never be completely prohibited, organized violence became the most effective form of coercion and the ultimate arbiter in world politics. Even when disputes were ended through negotiations, the threat of force still lay in the background and shaped the results severely (Orme, 1997:457).

However, with the advent of technology, coercion is becoming less attractive in consolidating conflicts amongst nations. The revolution of technology that has accompanied the industrial revolution; and the process by which the military and political impact of that revolution has spread, has had a profound impact on all aspect of society, including the military, science, and in human condition as a whole (Shapley, 1978:1102-5). Scholars like Brodie and Brodie and others explore also the linkages between military technological developments and the overall advance of scientific and technological knowledge (Brodie and Brodie, 1973:5-9).

Indeed, the technological aspect of the global strategic environment is part of a centuries-long process of transformation. The technological advance and the diffusion of this advanced technology are the two elements of this transformation. Before the process took off the standard of military technology was similar and the pace was slow. In the mean time

both elements of transformation interact powerfully, the play between them and the stage of the development they have reached are the major factors affecting the core concepts of strategic studies (Buzan, 1978:9).

The advent of the nuclear weapons and technology (nuclear proliferation) altered the nature of the prevailing military and strategic thinking which as a result affected international politics. Hence, the concept of war as such has also changed in such a way that the dangers inherited in allowing conflict to escalate in the nuclear era meant that war could no longer be viewed, as it has traditionally been. Technology and nuclear weapons played a critical role in strategic thinking, and raised the importance of strategic studies in dealing with nuclear weapons, and how to prevent the use of them (Cimbala, 1987: 13).

The literature of strategic studies concerns about the security of states under the anarchy during which states try to adjust military strategy to meet the end in an environment dominated by continuous and often quite fundamental technological and political change. In this situation the concern arises of how to ensure human survival in an environment dominated by enormous powers of destruction. As long as the anarchic political structure of the international system, and the expanding human knowledge that drives the technological imperative exist, the solution will be only through strategic terms (Buzan,1984b:290).

II.I. The Historical Foundations of Strategic Studies
Three decades of writings have accumulated since strategic studies emerge as a separate field during the 1950s. Pre nuclear strategic thinking has a writing dating back 2500 years to the writing of Sun Tzu. The expansion of strategic studies during the last 30 years has

been driven by rapid developments in technology, conflict, and politics. These developments range from new weapons, such as cruise missiles, to new wars, like that in the Gulf, to changes in political alignments, like the Sino-Soviet split. These changes have to be understood not only in themselves, but also in terms of their impact on prevailing strategic theories and policies (Buzan, 1987:1).

Generally speaking, strategy can be defined as: "the art or science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field of conflict" (Bull, 1968: 593). For strategic studies, these means are military ones, the field of conflict is the international system, and the ends are the political objectives of actors large enough to list as important in the international context.

Since states control the overwhelming bulk of military power, therefore strategic studies is mostly about the use of force within and between states, and it's also about the instruments of force, and how these instruments affect relations among states that possess them. Halle also offers one of the few attempts to define the whole field of strategic studies" the branch of political studies concerned with the political implications of the War making capacity available to nations" (Halle, 1984: 4).

From all these definitions it clear that the essence of strategy is about force, or the threat of force, it's also understood very much about the instruments of that force. The advent of nuclear weapons has raised the importance of threat to use force which make the study of strategy since 1945 emphasis on the instrument of force, the use of threat, and the problem of how to prevent the use of nuclear weapons (Gray, 1982a:3).

In broadest view, the definition and the basic ideas of strategic studies comes within the broader field of international relations. The rooted character of strategic studies within international relations is similar to that of a major organ within a living body. International relations cover a broad range which includes political, economic, social, legal, and cultural interactions as well as military ones. Strategic studies can be seen in the same light as international law, as a sub field specializing in one aspect of larger one. But this view does not stand up to a searching examination; this due to the essential elements of strategy which cannot be disentangled from the political and economic parts of the IR system. In the subject of war for instance, war supposed to be clearly belonging to Strategic Studies. While it's true that states threaten each other with war on purely military grounds, the threat and use of force usual bespeak grounds for rivalry rooted in consideration of power, ideology and wealth (Ibid, 4).

The significance of Strategic Studies is conditioned by two variables affecting the international system: Political structure and the nature of widespread technologies available to the political actors (Buzan, 1984b: 21). Anarchy is the prevailing political structure regulator, it has no world government to control the use of force and enforce universal law. The authority is vested in the states and not in the whole system. That is why states relate to each other according to their own values and the limits of their own power. Relations in such system take the form of balance of power, while the order in this form of balance of power depends on the extent of disagreement among the major powers, and willingness of other states to agree to the norms and rules, and the willingness of the largest powers to guarantee it. This structure of anarchy sets the political background in which strategy

becomes relevant to the affairs of states, and to the inevitable complement of political life within the international anarchy (Krasner, 1992:39).

As for the nature of the prevailing technologies available to political actors: Anarchy creates the need for strategy, and set the conditions that determine the ends for which force is used. Technology is a major factor in determining the range of military options, the character of military threats, and the consequences of resorting to the use of force, and it is a major variable that affecting the instruments of force available to the political actors, the nature of these instruments sets the basic condition for strategy (Brodie, 1978:65-83).

Throughout history, technology has been an important factor in military strategy; it defines much of the contemporary strategic agenda. Concepts such as war, crises, alliances, terrorism, power and security all are conditioned by the character of prevailing technology. Strategic concepts like defense, deterrence, mutually assured destruction, arm racing control and disarmament also derives from technology.

History views that the middle of the nineteenth century has witnessed a basic alteration in military technology. Because of the industrial revolution major changes in technology began to occur recurrently, long periods of technological continuity disappeared, and new norms of change become known. Therefore, the mid- nineteenth century can be identified as a major historical boundary in the relationship between technology and strategy. This revolution in technology was quantitative in the large number, frequency of changes, and in the increased numbers of new items. As a consequence to this revolution of technology, no wars would ever be fought under the same conditions as previous one, and the

technological change began to show the way to an enduring review of military strategy, the scope of this revolution in technology was obvious in the capabilities of fire power, communications, protection, and intelligence (Pearton, 1982:117-139).

II.II The Revolution in Military Technology and its Consequences on Strategic Thinking

Through defining the consequence of technology on the strategic thinking, scholars understand that the middle of the nineteenth century as mentioned before has witnessed essential transformation in the military technology. The strategic thinking before the nuclear age was concerned of how to fight and win wars. Strategists like Ken Booth have intensive efforts on the evolution of strategic thinking into the modern field of strategic studies.

Other Strategists from classical times like sun Tzu and Thucydides, through the major military writers of the nineteenth century, Gemini, Clause Wits, and Mahan, to the military theorists of mechanical warfare in the 1920 and 1930, like Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell, all are concerned with the art of fighting, while this tradition continues into to the nuclear age among professional military strategists almost everywhere (Buzan, 1987:31).

Nuclear weapons are the greatest threat to the survival of mankind. In 1945, two nuclear bombs with an explosive power of about 30 thousand tones of high explosive destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing about 300,000 people. Since that time the nuclear arsenals have grown to the equivalent of about four tones of Explosive per person. A

fraction of nuclear weapons if used would result in a catastrophic of inconceivable extent (Thee, 1981:17).

When examining nuclear weapons of mass destruction, one can understand why strategies are so crucial to the deployment of these weapons, and how changes in strategic developments influenced practitioners' strategic thinking culminated with the fact that war is becoming increasingly more destructive and expensive, and sophisticated. In other words, the mounting technological developments in military strategy have had transcend the boundaries of the standard classic battle field.

Since 1945 nuclear weapons made waging wars, and the dependence on the offensive-dominant military capability was very difficult due to the additional technological factor of the surplus capacity of destructive power provided in it. Therefore, due to the nature of these weapons deterrence option became the central concept of contemporary strategic thinking. The question worth raising here is whether nuclear weapons can be seen as an effective mechanism in neutralizing the propensity of war amongst the great powers within the international anarchy?

Studies reveal that the roots of the modern strategic studies were clearly in the trends that shaped strategic thinking from the nineteenth century to the Second World War. The most two important of these trends were the increasing scale and the speed of war in relation to the size of the societies generating it, and the decreasing degree of similarity between each new war and the one that preceded it. The factors underlying these changes were the rising

wealth, the organizational power of states, and the technological innovation opened up the industrial revolution.

Clausewitz, who was the most nineteenth century strategists influential wrote in response to the transformation in the technique of warfare, revealed by the Napoleonic wars, most of his work was about the technological change which began towards the middle of the nineteenth century, and captured the new political element in war that had been unleashed by the French Revolution. The French revolution had discovered the military power of mass mobilization and the ideological and nationalists tools by which that power could be controlled. This discovery transformed the conditions of power and enabled one country to occupy most of Europe for more than two decades. It forced countries to find ways of tapping the same source of power and transforming war fare from being an Elite affair of states to a mass affair of nations. This social transformation in war far began in France and America and its spread developments were major features in the changing character of war right through nuclear age (Howard, 1981:70-71).

The continued relevance of Clausewitz rests to an extent to his being the first to capture the political essence of the transformation that had begun in his time. The political thread in his thinking provides a strong connection to more modern revolutionary strategists from Lenin onwards, Most other nineteenth-century military strategists were also concerned with the continuous transformation in the conditions of war resulting from new technologies. The interaction of these technologies with the enhanced mobilization of the nation state outdated centuries of military wisdom, and pushed technological factors into the fore front of military calculation and planning. The full impact on war fare of the steady increase in

technological was not discovered by the most bilateral wars fought in Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth century, by the end of the century few people had foreseen what the technological revolution was doing to military capability. The most notable of these thinkers were "Ivan Bloch and Norman Angell" (Pearton, 1982:137-9).

Bloch examined the effects of the increasing of the firepower and argued that wars can destroy the societies and not all wars can be won (Ibid, 137-139). At the same time, Angell also argued that war no longer served the economic interests of society, for industrial societies war destroy more wealth than it created and states no longer gain wealth by seizing territory and resources from each other as they had done during the mercantilist period in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Howard, 1981: 70-71).

Despite the existence of this wisdom, the main strategic effect of increasing military capabilities prior 1914 was to encourage the doctrines of the offensive (Van Evera, 1984) but in reality the character of the change in the conditions of war had out run the development of strategic thinking that war bore no similarity to what had been expected. The full exposure came in the four years after 1914 with a big surprise to the military war-making capacities of states rested. As the Bloch prediction that the defense was everywhere dominant and war became a contest in resources and survival instead of the vital war of offense and tactic planned by the European military staffs, what occurred in most threats of war was an indecisive, drawn-out stalemate that consumed human and material resources on a huge scale. This physical and social cost of wars was confirmed by Angell's view that war had become economically counterproductive; it raised doubts as whether war can serve

as an instrument of state policy within Europe for any objective short of national survival (Hedley, 1968:593-605).

In Britain and France there were real fears among leaders and among public also that another war in Europe would destroy the physical base of European civilization. These visions were similar to those of the nuclear age. They raised questions about the imbalance between means and ends which modern conditions forced on extreme war. These questions are the same as the modern strategic studies preoccupy though it took another war and another leap in the technology of destruction before strategic analysts confronted them directly (Tuchman, 1967: 15).

The military strategic of the inter war years did not stop thinking about war, they were military professionals and could not do that without abandoning their whole training and tradition, the most creative among them sought ways to restore the efficiency of military means, which meant restoring the dominance of the offensive in effect no longer generate a huge disproportion between means and ends only if victory could be achieved quickly (Baylis, 197:30-31). Their hope for restoring the power of offensive lay in the emerging new technologies such as air craft and armored vehicles, the restoration of mobility in the Second World War assert and indicated their vision. Thus, because of new technology and tactics, the power of defense enhanced and did not reduce the scale of the fighting or the vastness of the resources inspired. Both did not produce quick victory considering that the list of casualties in the Second World War outnumbered five times that the First World War.

By 1945 it was clear that wars had become an irrational instrument in the relations between major powers, and there are no reasons that justified the costs of it. Revolutionary states like the USSR and capitalist states like Britain and France acknowledged the fact that the cost of war is not worthy mainly due the advent of the nuclear age (Cimbala, 1987: 13).

The destructive power represented by atomic bombs made the lesson obvious to those parts of the world where whole cities or countries had been devastated by conventional military means. Bernard Brodie captured the new strategic situation created by the military technology of the nuclear age with his quoted statement of 1946 "This far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them it can have almost no other useful purpose" (Brodie, 1946: 76).

Nuclear weapons were symbols of military and national power, nuclear testing was often used both to test new designs as well as to send political messages, and they were the heart of many national and international political disputes. They have played a major part in popular culture since their dramatic public presentation in the 1940s and have usually symbolized the ultimate ability of mankind to utilize the strength of nature for destruction (Richelson, 2006).

Like other weapons, nuclear weapons are more than tools of national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic politics and bureaucratic struggles and also serve as international symbols of modernity and identity. According to this perspective, state behavior is not determined by leader's cold calculations about national security or parochial domestic interests, but rather by "deeper norms and shared beliefs

about what international actions are legitimate and modern (Sagan, 1977:155). Many arsenals and warheads are envisioned as serving symbolic functions of the state like flags and airlines. They are part of an unspoken international norm that defines what it means to be a major modern, legitimate state (Ibid, 155).

These symbols of legitimacy in the international arena are often contested at first, and the resulting norms may be spread by power and coercion not by strength of idea alone. Still, once created, such international norms, like being a nuclear power, can take on the life of their own. Nations want nuclear weapons to enhance their political prestige and status internationally, not just as a military weapon. States possessing nuclear weapons feel they are taken more seriously in the entire range of foreign policy matters.

The demonstration effect of super power deterrence cannot help but encourage nuclear aspirations among lesser powers. Nuclear deterrence among the great powers is therefore fundamentally at odds with the attempt to promote non proliferation among the lesser powers that are outside the system of super power nuclear guarantees. But on the other hand, vertical proliferation adds to what are already compelling reasons for many states to be hesitant about joining the ranks of the nuclear powers (Gupta, 1983:61).

After presenting the historical developments of strategies and their direct implications on international relations, the next section will explain the significant role of nuclear weapons and technology (nuclear proliferation) and its direct association with deterrence as a step towards understanding how stability is understood within international relations context.

II.III. Deterrence within Theoretical Perspective

Generally speaking, deterrence theory passed through three periods in the development of western nuclear strategy- the first wave, the golden age, and the third wave. These periods provide a useful framework within which to organize a description of how deterrence policies have evolved since the opening of the nuclear age in 1945 (Gray, 1982a:15-17). The study of deterrence reflects both the historical position and the social conditions of the western powers. The study is deemed a distinct concept because it gives priority to war prevention as a strategic objective. Indeed, the advent of nuclear weapons imposed a historical turning point on the emergence of deterrence. Historically speaking, the character of the western and American society has influenced the way in which deterrence has been conceived and implemented. The western winners of the Second World War inherited the problem of security management in the international system. They faced a situation totally altered from that of the period before the war especially with the emergence of the nuclear Soviet Union as a serious major opponent (Hedley, 1968:593-605).

Deterrence theory developed within a political context defined by status quo policy concerns. American economic and military hegemony, and the dominance of western culture, were challenged principally by the military and ideological power of the Communist Bloc. After the experience of the Second World War, western societies were not in a militarily aggressive mood. War had lost its appeal as an instrument of state policy for anything except the most basic issues of national survival and domestic welfare concerns headed the political agenda (Gillespie, 1979:250-262).

This politically and defensive outlook harmonized with the war prevention generated by nuclear weapons. It fits well into the predisposition of advanced capitalist societies to prefer capital intensive technologies as the basis of their military strength. War prevention was preferred and required because of nuclear weapons, as will because of the west's political position. This combination produced sarong normative orientation within strategic studies towards security defined in terms of stability (Gray, 1982a:11). Yet as Carr observed before the nuclear age, security is the watch word of the status quo powers; their attempt to define their own interests in universal terms is not a moral position but a part of power politics. Nevertheless, the military conditions of the nuclear age have added a new dimension to the traditional policy ploys of the status quo powers (Carr, 1946:79-105).

The goal of war prevention also meant that nuclear strategy was concerned with the period before war broke out, rather than, as in traditional strategy, after. The point of deterrence strategy was to stop one's opponent from using in the first place, not to defeat an attack after it had started. The nuclear strategy opened up a new field in which nobody could claim prior expertise of using weapons primarily to threaten. It worth noting here that nuclear strategy was more political oriented nowadays than the traditional strategy in the past because it sought to work on the decision making of political leaders, rather than to compete with the military skills of rival military commanders (Freedman, 1981:176-7).

American strategists writing immediately after the end of the Second World War laid down most of the basic ideas that were later to become the core of Western deterrence theory (Herken, 1984:15-18). The work of the first Wave writers was primarily an intellectual response to the advent of nuclear weapons, these writers tried to work out the theoretical

consequences for international relations of the deployment of such weapons by the major powers. Despite its high quality, this early thinking made little impact precisely because it was theoretical, and no major deployments of nuclear weapons had yet occurred. The first wave writers were thinking ahead to a time when both the United States and the Soviet Union would possess nuclear weapons.

Second: the golden age was related to the changes in technology and the balance of power that set the evolving security problem of the west. By the mid-1950s the international environment had changed substantially from that in which the First Wave writers worked, many of their ideas had to be reinvented when Strategic Studies blossomed into its Golden Age during the decade from the mid 1950s to the mid-1960s. The Soviet Union had tested a nuclear device in 1948, ahead of expectations, and by the mid-1950s was well in the nuclear race. Nuclear armed rivalry was imminent; a situation which obviously made the west's problem of war prevention much more difficult than it had been during the first post-war decade (Harvey, 1998:675-707).

The policy problem that triggered the Golden Age appeared in the concrete form of a hostile opponent acquiring a pace the military technology that had hitherto given the west a decisive military edge. Against a more powerful opponent, the problem of how to prevent war took on greater urgency for two reasons. First, the loss of nuclear monopoly undermined the whole logic of threat by possession of superior destructive power which the west had so far counted on to dissuade the Soviet Union from military aggression. Secondly, nuclear mutuality made real the theoretical conditions foreseen in the first wave

writers, where war became so destructive to fight that almost no conceivable policy objective of the state would justify resort to it.

The coming of nuclear mutuality provided the general backdrop for the flowering of deterrence theory. But it was the Eisenhower administration's 1954 announcement of Massive Retaliation that provided the link between academic strategy and public policy which was to prove such a durable feature of Strategic Studies. The doctrine of Massive Retaliation reflected a desire to use American nuclear superiority to offset the Soviet advantage in locally deployed conventional forces in Europe and Asia.

The decade of the Golden Age marked a period of profound transformation in the character of military relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the momentous transition from a nearly unipolar nuclear power system to a solidly bipolar one (Buzan, 1987:145). On the other hand, the Soviets had broken out of an intolerable position of unilateral vulnerability into the comparatively congenial atmosphere of mutual threat (Zimmerman, 1969:169). For the west, the shift to bipolarity represented a major deterioration of position, and a weakening of the deterrence umbrella that the United States had so easily extended over them during the 1950s. Within a decade, the United States slipped from being militarily invulnerable and superior, to being vulnerable, and merely the first among equals. Yet despite this slippage the United States still carried the huge security burden, acquired when it was superior, of defending the status quo for the west. In particular, it had still to prevent the Soviet Union from reaping political advantage from its strong position against Western Europe. The theory, despite its objective elements, developed very much in response to this western view of the problem (Art, 1980:3-35) The

Golden Age drifted to a close in the mid-1960s. It ended because all of the basic concepts and vocabulary necessary for the debate about nuclear strategy had been worked out.

The third wave was about adjusting the body of ideas and policies to the changing circumstances of superpower rivalry. The essence of the third Wave has been to challenge mutually assured destruction by extending the logic of limited nuclear war into a full scale denial doctrine of extended deterrence by threat of war fighting, and mounting the idea of defense against nuclear attack which is sufficiently effective to allow escape from the whole logic of mutual deterrence by threat of retaliation (Gray, 1982:15-17). Thus the third wage is beyond the scope of this thesis.

II.III.I. Deterrence in the Cold War Era

Nuclear weapons forced the superpowers to turn deterrence into an elaborate national security strategy. Without the Cold War it would probably have remained an "occasional stratagem" (Freedman, 1996:1). As a strategy, it offered an elaborate guide for bringing military power to stand on central national security objectives, it became the dominant strategy. The superpowers nuclear deterrence gradually generated an interdependent security management for the international systems, derived from steps taken by individual states for their own security, therefore deterrence related policies came to shape and contain conflict at lower levels in the system. This was often on display, from particular conflicts to controlling proliferation. Hence Deterrence in the Cold War can be viewed not only a war avoidance but rather as a world order concept (Kaldor, 1991:321). Or it was viewed as a functional equivalent to a monopoly of violence at the global level and thus amounted to a functional equivalent of the monopoly of violence of the state as an order maintaining

capability (Van Benthem Van den Bergh, 1996: 31). It's important to know that super powers deterrence was shaped by the intensity of the Cold War within which the primary element preventing another great war.

General deterrence appeared pervasive often a step away from turning into crises. This reliance on deterrence (the essence of a cold war) drove unprecedented stable time defense spending and military capabilities (Harvey, 1998:7). Deterrence also was shaped by nuclear weapons. In the shadow of the vast arsenals, preventing a major war was the paramount national security objective and the focus of super power efforts to manage global or regional security (Segan, 1993:167).

The exact nature of the threat was perennially in dispute domestically and between the US and its allies. The US got the primary challenger wrong in both Korea and Vietnam, thinking it was really the Soviet Union, China and the Soviet bloc. Defining American interests turned out to be quite difficult in the Berlin and Taiwan Straits crises, and in relations with China. What nuclear weapons simplified was destructive capacity. Defining unacceptable damage for the opponent was in constant dispute at other than the most extreme level, while the problem of stability were never resolved to general satisfaction. Even treating nuclear deterrence as a success came to be seen by some as problematic (Harvey, 1998:241).

Nuclear weapons made it simple to threaten unacceptable damage, and made it possible that deterrence might work consistently and therefore only modest number of weapons could do overwhelming damage and the nuclear arsenals were greater than needed, there was no

choice but to rest deterrence on retaliation capabilities rather than defenses. This leads to unsuccessful searches for ways to escape the resulting vulnerability, from a first-strike capacity to effective defenses. The great powers remained dependent on deterrence, which ultimately rested on the threat of a terribly punitive retaliation, and many others depended on the great powers deterrence too (Jervis, 1989:183-207).

Turning deterrence into a regime for global security management was due to the combined effect of both the Cold War rivalry and the nuclear weapons. With much of the world an arena for the East- West dispute, superpower rivalry carried much further than it otherwise would have. The Soviets held the so- called global correlation of forces ultimately responsible for deterring the imperialists. On the contrary, the American views were that in a political and psychological sense a loss anywhere was a loss everywhere. Defining what happened in many areas as directly bearing on their security, and frequently undertaking interventions, the superpowers broadened the impact of their conflict on everyone else (Ibid,241).

Super power nuclear deterrence contained other built-in pressures to ward global security management. When relying solely on it eventually seemed too dangerous; deterrence was extended into maintaining large conventional forces and preventing any conventional war in the East-west relations. While not fully successful, this kept a lid on some wars that involved a great power and eliminated such wars in a sensitive area like Europe. Deterrence stability also required containing direct super power confrontations in various trouble spots.

Deterrence dragged the two parties at times into trying to limit others conventional warfare or internal conflicts. The motivation was fear of escalation. East- west deterrence became global security management when, out of concern for stability, it made local conflicts of concern at the highest level. In security management mutual deterrence was a bilateral and sometimes multilateral attempt, involving cooperation among friends and enemies alike.

There was more than a little tension between the imperatives of Cold War competition and the necessities of deterrence. The former incited military interventions, the accumulation of client states and allies, taking sides in local conflicts in ways that exacerbated them, huge arms transfers, and other steps that often made global and regional security more cautious.

 Offsetting this, acting as a governor on the Cold War engine, this was restraint out of the preoccupation with deterrence stability. Thus the Middle East became a very dangerous place and the super powers played a large role in making it so, yet their forces were never drawn into fighting there and wars in the region were limited at their insistence (Harvey, 1998:241).

However, there were also tensions within mutual deterrence atop of the system. The military equivalent to political concern about a lose any where being a loss everywhere was preoccupation with credibility. But nuclear deterrence made credibility suspect. Fear of escalation made even threats below the strategic level suspect. Concern to convey will lead to insistence on the interdependence of commitments that played such an important role in American foreign policy (Harvey, 1998:241).

In short, due to the effective role of deterrence triggered by technological developments, the great powers have shown increasing reluctance to employ force openly against one another or even against weaker states. The following two chapters will reveal how this apparent hesitation has led to the belief that the central role of armed force is rapidly diminishing. The central assertion of that belief is that the cost, risks, and difficulties in applying force are rising while the benefit derived from it is declining due to the diminished visibility of military force above all else to the presence of nuclear weapons. These terrifying devices act as mutual deterrents, they maintain the most limited use of force could set in action a process of unplanned and uncontrollable escalation discourages the resort to violence at any level.

As shown below in the empirical analysis and case studies, the unprecedented destructiveness of the atomic bomb has compelled superpowers during the Cold War to resolve conflicts through test of force rather than overt violence. These contests are won by the side that conveys an image of superior credibility. Because states are more committed to preserving their territory and independence than their opponents are to exaggeration, the defender enjoys an enormous advantage. Furthermore, as Orme argues, the victor in a nuclear war would find the radioactive legacy in his possession afterward small reward for the devastation the enemy could call on his own land. Nuclear force is useful for the defense of territory that it reduces conventional offensive forces to incapacity, thereby eliminating the risk of attack and freezing the territorial status quo (Orme, 1997:457).

Chapter III

The US, the USSR, and the Road towards Escalation (1958-68)

Part II: Empirical Analysis

Chapter III: The US, the USSR, and the Road for Escalation (1958-68)

This Chapter aims at examining the political/ ideological developments as well as the military/ strategic advancements that triggered escalation between the two superpowers camps during the Cold War. This shall lay the ground to introduce and analyze the heated – though non-confrontational case-studies incidents between these powers. Accordingly, the chapter will be divided into three main sections: first, it will discuss the developments of political and ideological hostilities before reviewing the strategic and military ones (second section). The third section on the other hand, will present three main incidents that took place between the superpowers between the periods of 1958-1968. Given this, the chapter will subsequently lay the foundations to chapter four which will examine how and why stability as such was formulated during these periods.

Introduction:

The Cold War was inevitable from the very beginning of the Soviet-American relationship; the ideologies of the two nations were fundamentally incompatible. Their political, social, and economic systems were divergent in the extreme. The United States was republican and democratic; Russia on the other hand, was an old autocracy, hostile to democracy, racist, and known for cruel repression of its numerous subjects.

Initially, Russians and Americans were able to overcome their ideological, political, and social differences; however, there was another factor that seemed to make eventual conflict between the two nations inevitable. Both were expansionist states whose spheres of interest

eventually would expand to global dimensions (Windt, 1991:3). Such trend caused conflict of interests between these superpowers within which direct confrontation was so conceivable.

Thus, the following empirical analysis will present a number of case studies demonstrating such incident. In it, the chapter will try to explain how and why the scenario of direct confrontation failed. Indeed, answers considerably reside within factors mentioned in above chapters related mainly to the fear of massive retaliation based on deterrence – within balance of powers context- and sophisticated nuclear arsenals. Before doing so, the chapter will present a historical background on those developments that carried out the escalations between the two rivalries since the end of the Cold War as a step towards understanding how the following the case studies emerged and why they had been resolved.

III.I The Emergence of the US-Soviet Political and Ideological Escalation

III.I.I Truman Presidency and the Evolution of Containment Policy: 1945-1953

President Truman entered the White House in 1945 expecting to continue Roosevelt's effort to build a collaborative relationship with the Soviet Union. Yet, within a year, the Grand Alliance was teared up and the United States and the Soviet Union had again become enemies. Primarily because of a severe escalation of the Cold War during Truman's presidency, the United States would abandon its prewar isolationism once and for all and adopt a policy of containing the expansion of communism in Europe (Painter, 1999: 5). Truman was responsible for the postwar breakdown of Soviet-American relations. With almost no experience in international relations, he was more vulnerable to the anti-Soviet

views of former Roosevelt advisers who stayed on in Truman's administration, to pressing Truman to take a tougher stance against the Soviets.

In 1947 Greece became another theater of the Cold War. Occupied by Britain after the war, Greece was overwhelmed by major problems of relief and reconstruction, paralyzed by an economy on the verge of collapse, threatened by hostile Balkan neighbors, and fractured by a civil war that pitted the supporters of the right-wing government of Constantine Tsaldares against a coalition of socialists, communists, and liberals. In parallel, the British, who were hard-pressed by an acute economic crisis, informed the United States that, they could no longer bear the burden of trying to keep order in Greece. The Truman administration decided to assume the responsibility the British were about to surrender (Gaddis, 1990:10-11).

On the other hand, The Soviets naturally regarded the prospect of a West German state with ties to the enormously powerful United States as a new German danger. To prevent it, the Soviets applied pressure on the divided city of Berlin, 125 miles deep inside the Soviet zone. In March 1948 the Soviets began to restrict Western ground travel into West Berlin, and on June 24 they brought it to a complete stop.

The Berlin blockade completed the transformation in America's approach to the Soviet Union that had begun with Truman's presidency in April 1945. At the time of the Yalta Conference, in February 1945, Soviet objectives were seen by Americans as essentially defensive, but by 1948 a study of the newly created National Security Council, NSC-20, viewed the Soviet goal as nothing less than the domination of the entire world. It insisted

that America's primary objective must be one of reducing the power and influence of Moscow by all means possible, including the liberation of Eastern Europe, the dismantling of the Soviet military establishment, and the dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party (Goldberg, 1984:13-14). Since then, the US-Soviet relations began deeply to be deteriorated by which political, economic, as well as military actions began to emerge between the two powers.

III.I.II. US Containment Policy: The Emergence of Marshall Plan and the NATO

The Truman administration regarded the Berlin blockade as a major test of the West's determination to defend the freedom of not only West Berlin but all of Western Europe. Consequently, the United States took dynamic countermeasures. Traffic into West Berlin from the Soviet zone was halted. In addition, the United States undertook an enormous airlift of supplies into West Berlin that enabled the city to withstand the Soviet monopoly (Powaski, 1998: 75). Furthermore, in an obvious demonstration of U.S. atomic power, sixty B-29s were transmitted to Britain by the president. Although the B-29s were called atomic bombers, they carried no atomic weapons. Nevertheless, the action made the previously tacit threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union explicit for the first time.

It was not the threat of nuclear devastation, however, that moved the Soviets to end their blockade of West Berlin. Instead, they came to see that the blockade of Berlin would probably speed the formation of a unified West German state rather than prevent it. Moreover, the Soviet blockade of West Berlin produced an economically Western counter blockade of the Soviet zone. As well the Berlin blockade was a vast propaganda defeat for the Soviet Union, for it gave additional substance to the U.S. hard-line interpretation of

Soviet intentions. In May 1949 the Soviets ended their blockade after the Western powers agreed to lift their counter blockade. Despite the pacific termination of this first Berlin crisis, its occurrence nevertheless destroyed any remaining hope for the rapid reunification of Germany (Gaddis, 1987:5).

In 1949 the Western powers transformed their occupation zones into a West German state. The Soviets responded in the same year by establishing a communist state in their zone, which they styled the German Democratic Republic. The division of Germany sealed the postwar division of Europe into rival American and Soviet spheres of influence (Mcmahon, 2003: 78). Truman declared that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." The president requested congressional approval for $300 million in aid for Greece and another $100 million for Turkey to help them meet the communist challenge. He asserted that giving aid to Greece and Turkey was part of a global struggle "between alternative ways of life" and that the fall of these nations to communism would produce similar results elsewhere (Schlesinger, 1967:47).

The Truman Doctrine proved to be the first step in a global ideological crusade against communism. "By presenting aid to Greece and Turkey in terms of ideological conflict between two ways of life," historian John Lewis Gaddis has observed, "Washington officials encouraged a simplistic view of the Cold War which was, in time, to imprison American diplomacy in an ideological straitjacket that may well have contributed to the perpetuation of the Cold War" (Gaddis, 1972:352).

Besides the Truman Doctrine, the other component of the emerging Truman containment strategy was the Marshall Plan. It was designed as a massive economic aid program to rebuild Western Europe. The economic recovery of Europe, administration officials realized, would help ensure that Western Europe remained politically stable, sufficiently conservative to protect America's European economic investments, and, as a result, less susceptible to Soviet pressure. Although the Soviet Union and its East European satellite states were invited to participate in the Marshall Plan, it was soon apparent that their involvement would seriously compromise Soviet economic and political interests. In return for U.S. economic assistance, the Soviets feared the United States would require a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Consequently, the Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan and subsequently pressured its satellites to follow suit. As an alternative to the Marshall Plan, on October 5 the Soviets announced the creation of their own economic assistance program, the so-called Molotov Plan (Schoenbaum, 1989:483).

The rival economic plans reinforced the existing military division of Europe by creating competing economic spheres of influence. In the West, Marshall Plan economic assistance either revitalized or created for the first time democratic governments that were based upon, or at least tolerant of free market principles. In the East, the Molotov Plan became the basis of COMECON, which welded the economies of Eastern Europe to the Soviet economy. The economic regimentation of Eastern Europe was accompanied by intensified political repression, since the Soviets saw no further need to pacify Western opinion. By the spring of 1948, when a Communist coup brought Czechoslovakia firmly into the Soviet bloc, the last remainder of democracy had vanished in Eastern Europe (Painter, 1999:31).

Finally US efforts were intensified with the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Soviet atomic bomb directly contributed to the creation of America's first entangling European alliance, NATO, in 1949. The North Atlantic alliance was a product of what came to be called The Cold War consensus. It held that, if the United States again withdrew into isolation, Western Europe would fall under the domination of another aggressive power, the Soviet Union, and this situation would again require U.S. military intervention. The American people, influenced largely by the aggressiveness displayed by the Soviet Union after World War II, came to believe that it would be far less expensive in lives and wealth to prevent another global conflagration than it would be to win one after it had begun (Block, 1977, 10).

Another factor that encouraged the United States to abandon its isolationist tradition was a growing realization that the oceans no longer offered the nation much protection against attack. This was even more obvious after the Soviets developed an atomic bomb of their own and the means to deliver it. Still, even after the Soviet Union's aggressive tendencies had been confirmed in the eyes of most Americans, the Truman administration at first sought to limit the U.S. commitment to European security primarily to economic assistance, as expressed in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The administration initially believed that Britain could and would bear the major military responsibility for defending the continent against the Soviets. However, the British government was eventually able to convince the administration that Britain could not do so, even with massive U.S. economic assistance. The United States would have to make a military commitment to Europe's defense (Leffler, 1994:190).

The first step toward the North Atlantic alliance, which was first proposed by Britain's Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was the creation of an Anglo-French alliance. This step was taken with the signing of the Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 (Gaddis, 1987:189). Although directed at Germany, the Dunkirk treaty also served as the nucleus of the Brussels Pact of 1948, which bound Britain and France to the defense of the Benelux countries. The Brussels Pact, in turn, served as the nucleus for the broader North Atlantic Alliance, which united the United States, Canada, and fourteen European nations or mutual defense. The heart of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, provided that an attack against any one of the signatories would be regarded as an attack against all, requiring the parties to respond to any such aggression by taking appropriate individual and collective action (Ibid,190).

A practical U.S. military commitment to Europe's defense did not exist until September 1950. In that month Truman decided to return U.S. combat troops to Europe to reinforce the American occupation troops that had been stationed in Germany since the end of the war. Their arrival, in the following year, created the possibility of an effective ground resistance to a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Needless to say, the new U.S. military presence only reinforced Soviet fears of America's aggressive intentions and prompted a new Soviet military buildup in the early 1950s (Leffler, 1994:201).

III.I.IV. Further Escalation under Eisenhower Presidency 1953-1961

The Cold War deepened and expanded during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. While the superpower stalemate was maintained in Europe, the rearmament of West Germany, the Hungarian Revolution, and the status of Berlin were among the issues that aggravated Cold War tension on that continent during the Eisenhower years. Although

Eisenhower kept his promise to end of the Korean War, Sino-American relations remained frigid, and, in fact, were aggravated during two crises in the Taiwan Strait. During the Eisenhower years, the United States also became more deeply involved in Indochina and took the first steps down the slippery slope to the Vietnam dilemma. The Cold War also intensified in the Middle East, as a result of Egypt's increasing dependence on the Soviet Union, and in Latin America, ending in the establishment of the first Soviet client state in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba. During Eisenhower's presidency, the Cold War spread even to sub-Saharan Africa, when the superpowers intervened in the internal affairs of the Congo. The Cold War truly became global in scope during the Eisenhower years. The friction between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World became increasingly dangerous as a result of a growing nuclear arms race during Eisenhower's years (Powaski, 1998: 98).

On March 5, 1953, shortly after Eisenhower entered the White House, Joseph Stalin died. Some historians believe Stalin's death created the opportunity for a Cold War soften. Stalin's successor and Premier Georgi Malenkov sought to relax superpower tensions in order to be free to concentrate on the Soviet Union's internal problems. He declared that there were no existing disputes that could not be decided by peaceful means (Ibid, 97).

Eisenhower believed that Stalin's death might clear the way for fundamental changes in Soviet behavior and an improvement in East West relations. He expressed his willingness to begin arms reduction talks if the Soviets would take concrete steps to resolve outstanding differences with the West. To test Soviet good will, Eisenhower proposed that the Soviets

allow free elections in Eastern Europe, sign an Austrian peace treaty, and stop supporting anti colonial rebellions in Asia.

Winston Churchill praised Eisenhower's speech, but privately he said that it did not go far enough. Call for returning to the high-level diplomacy that he had participated in at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. After Eisenhower's speech Churchill proposed a summit conference of world leaders to resolve Cold War differences. He was motivated by a growing fear of nuclear war, enhanced by the development of the hydrogen bomb (Mcmahon, 2003:82).

Any inclination that Eisenhower may have had to accept Churchill's summit proposal was squashed by his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. While Dulles acknowledged that it was possible for Soviet behavior to change, he did not think it was likely to occur soon. He believed the latest Soviet peace offer was simply an attempt to disrupt the U.S. effort to rearm West Germany and admit it into NATO. Therefore, for Dulles, a rapprochement with the Soviet Union at this time could have come only at the expense of weakening the West. Dulles's fear was shared by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. He feared that, to reduce the tensions of the Cold War, Churchill might be prepared to sacrifice the military integration of Western Europe and accept a permanent Soviet presence in Eastern and Central Europe. Adenauer urged Eisenhower to permit not even the prospect of German reunification to stand in the way of the restoration of West Germany's sovereignty and its integration into the Western community. Dulles also feared the domestic repercussions of negotiating with the Soviets. The Republican Party, and especially Senator McCarthy, had pilloried Truman for soothing the communists. Dulles was unwilling to add fuel to that fire by appearing eager to negotiate with the Soviets. As a result, the secretary of state

downplayed the significance of Eisenhower's April 16 speech. The Soviet peace initiative, he added, was simply another "tactical move of the kind for which Soviet communism has often practiced" (Leffler, 1994:205).

While Eisenhower undoubtedly had the final say on the direction his administration's foreign policy would take, and increasingly asserted himself with Dulles as time passed, he was reluctant early in his presidency, when McCarthyism was in full pace to challenge his more diplomatically experienced secretary of state on an issue as politically sensitive as negotiations with the Soviet Union As a result, nothing came of Malenkov's peace initiative (Ibid, 206).

III.I.V. Kennedy and Johnson: Confrontation vs. Cooperation, 1961-1969

At the beginning of John F. Kennedy's presidency, the Soviets indicated that they were prepared to improve relations with the United States. Khrushchev warmly congratulated the new president on his inauguration day and released two U.S. Air Force officers whose RB-47 reconnaissance plane had been shot down over Soviet territory the preceding July. Kennedy responded to these gestures by removing restrictions on the importation of Soviet crabmeat and by proposing a mutual increase in the number of consulates and scientific and cultural exchanges.

While Kennedy was inclined to improve Soviet-American relations, his ability to do so was restricted by his determination to appear tough toward communism. During his campaigning for the presidency, he said, "The enemy is the communist system itself, implacable, insatiable, and uneasy in drive for world domination"(Walton, 1972:9). While

it may be true, as Kennedy intimates have argued, that statements like these were nothing more than campaign rhetoric, they nevertheless precluded the possibility of calming public support for a Cold War soften early in his administration. Khrushchev's public rhetoric also made Soviet-American reconciliation difficult. Early in Kennedy's presidency, in 1961, the Soviet leader declared his country would support "wars of national liberation" in the underdeveloped world. Khrushchev's declaration, wrote the president's confidante Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "alarmed Kennedy more than Moscow's friendly signals assuaged him" (Schlesinger, 1965: 303). Although Kennedy was willing to negotiate an end to the Cold War, the Third World challenge which Khrushchev threw at him would have to be dealt with first.

Kennedy personalized the threat and converted them into tests of will, rather than ignoring or minimizing Khrushchev's threats in the process manufacturing crises that need not have been. "There was really nothing in the Eisenhower era comparable to the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962," Miroff observes, both of which represented the closest approaches to a superpower nuclear war during the Cold War (Miroff, 1976: 64).

For whatever reasons, whether they were primarily ideological, political, or psychological all were important in formulating his initial response to the Soviet Union. Kennedy chose to emphasize Khrushchev's aggressive actions rather than his friendly gestures. Only after Kennedy had proved to the Soviet leader that he was not soft on communism would diplomacy make any evolution during his presidency (Schlesinger, 1967:348).

Now having discussed the developments of political and ideological hostilities between the superpowers, the following section will try to examine the implications of such political antagonism on their strategic and military relations – with special reference to nuclear weapons-deterrence context- as a step towards introducing the case studies.

III.II. The Emergence of the US-Soviet Military Escalation

III.II.I. Nuclear Weapons and Stability

Detonation of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 announced to a stunned world the arrival of a new and frightening technology for mass destruction. No longer would it be necessary for states and their armed forces to first defeat the armed forces of their enemies before imposing unacceptable economic and human costs on enemy societies (Cimbala, 2002:1). Because nuclear missile weapons promised to accomplish so much devastation within such a short period of time against which no defenses were foreseeable, special thought had to be given to the control of nuclear forces (Ibid, 3).

The nuclear weapons had severed the connection between war and politics. It has changed the grammar of the relationship between force and policy, but the relationship itself still had to hold good. For that to happen, political leaders and military planners had to learn the arts of coercive diplomacy and crisis management in addition to the pre-nuclear means of managing military forces for political influence. Now the ability to manipulate threats and to provide offsetting reassurances appropriate to the dispute in question, and with a nuclear backdrop, became a necessary component of leader's political tool kits (Trachtenberg, 1991:3-46).

Nuclear weapons appeared to reverse the traditional relationship between offensive and defensive military strategies, in which the making of attacks was thought to be more risk loaded and problematical of success than the conduct of a successful defense. On the other hand, the speed and lethality of nuclear weapons made offensive technology look more impressive but not necessarily an offensive strategy. Weapons which could be protected from a first strike could be used to perform a retaliation of unprecedented destructiveness against the attacker. Unless the attacker could obtain preclusive protection against retaliation from the victim, the difference between the attacker's and the defenders postwar worlds might be politically and militarily unimportant (Cimbala, 2002:3).

The possibility of mass destruction in nuclear war imposed some discipline on the two Cold War superpowers. Nuclear weapons helped to maintain stability during the Cold War and to preserve peace throughout the instability that came in its wake. Except for interventions by major powers in conflicts that for them are minor, stability has become the privilege of states having nuclear weapons, while wars are fought by those who lack them. Week states cannot help noticing it, that is why states feeling threatened want their own nuclear weapons and why states that have them find it so hard to halt their spread (Waltz,1995:367).

In the Cold War a lengthy period of stability among the most powerful states is unprecedented. Almost as unusual is the caution which each super power has treated the other. It has been common to attribute this effect to the existence of nuclear weapons. Neither side could successfully protect itself in an all- out war no one could win or profit

from it. Of course this does not mean that wars will not occur. It is rational to start a war one does not expect to win, if it is believed that the likely consequences of not fighting are even worse. War could also come through loss of control, or irrationality. But if decision makers are sensible stability is the most likely out cone. Furthermore, nuclear weapons can explain superpower caution. When the cost of seeking excessive gains is an increased probability of total destruction, moderation makes sense (Jervis, 1988:92). As long as all-war means mutual devastation, it cannot be seen as a bath to security. The nuclear weapons make mutual security more feasible than it often was in the past, it permit the super powers to adopt military doctrines and bargaining tactics that make it possible for them to take advantage of their shared interest in preserving the status quo (Ibid,93).

The following section will shed the light on the nuclear deterrence as a military doctrine, and its role in maintaining stability during the cold war. As mentioned before, the Cold War era with all its rivalries, anxieties, and unquestionable dangers, has produced the longest period of stability in relations among the great powers that the world has known modern history. Again, this is mainly due to effective role of deterrence as one of the central elements of stability in the post war international system whereby the fear of nuclear destruction, hindered super power options to consider launching an attack on each other.

III.II.II. Nuclear Deterrence

Since the mid- 1950s nuclear weapons have decisively influenced U.S.-Soviet relations and the structure of the international system. They have introduced into the political, ideological and military competition between the two dominant nuclear powers an element

of mutual restraint and even partial cooperation that would have been inconceivable in an earlier stage of technological development (Mandelbaum, 1979:1).

It is important to be precise about the character of the political changes brought about by nuclear weapons and the way in which they were achieved. The development of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II was certainly not the first innovation in weapons technology with substantial political implications. However, weapons like the crossbow, the machine gun, the tank or military aircraft made their political impact by being employed in combat and influencing the outcome of a military engagement. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, were, fortunately, never used in such a military way. They became politically effective not through their physical impact, but by the perception that they could be used, by some basic concepts and theories about the way in which they could be employed and by an assessment of the possible political and physical effects of nuclear war (Brodie, 1983:40).

What makes nuclear weapons so unique? Already in the 1950s, scholars like Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling and others pointed out that the usual answer to this question revolves around the unacceptable amount of damage that could be inflicted by nuclear weapons - is insufficient, because historical evidence shows that there are too many conventional wars which ended with unacceptable damage. The possibility that a war might end in such a way has, apparently, not induced former military powers to the same kind of caution or prudence as the prospect of nuclear war. Probably more important are the following two points:

With the advent of nuclear weapons, an unacceptable level of destruction can be achieved in a much shorter time and with a higher degree of certainty than before. A massive nuclear strike could be carried out in hours or a few days, and an effective defense of non-military targets against the effects of nuclear explosions appears to be impossible for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the destruction that has to be expected if nuclear weapons are used makes traditional notions of victory meaningless. The victor can be punished for his victory: he is not able to escape nuclear retaliation from his opponent.

In addition, nuclear war could affect the global natural system in an unpredictable way. The important point is not how reliable predictions of a nuclear winter really are, but recognition of the fact that the amount of energy that could be released by nuclear weapons is so high, and our knowledge of the ecological system so incomplete, that permanent changes in our global environment cannot be definitely precluded (Lynch, 1987: 5)

These basic facts are the foundation on which the present Western consensus on nuclear strategy is built. In spite of all internal Western differences on nuclear strategy and regular shifts in the official strategic doctrine of the United States, the basic concepts and theories of nuclear strategy have changed very little since the mid-1950s (Heisenberg1989:3).

Indeed, technology and nuclear weapons played a critical role in strategic thinking, and raised the importance of strategic studies in dealing with nuclear weapons, and how to prevent their use. Therefore, nuclear warfare strategy was a way for either fighting or avoiding a nuclear war. The policy of trying to ward off a potential attack by a nuclear weapon from another country by threatening nuclear retaliation is known as the strategy of

nuclear deterrence. The term deterrence becomes important in strategic debate only until the early years of nuclear age (Buzan, 1987:7).

 The goal in deterrence is to always maintain a second strike status (the ability of a country to respond to a nuclear attack with one of its own) and potentially to strive for first strike status (the ability to completely destroy an enemy's nuclear forces before they could retaliate). One of the disputes in the debates about deterrence arises from the relationship between defense and deterrence. Some authors treat the two as distinct, alternative, and incompatible approaches to policy (Art, 1980:5-7), while others assume that there is a broad overlap between them (Gray,1982a:84-92). This difference has major implications for what is meant by the term deterrence. It has both definitional and political roots, and one must have a clear understanding of it before trying to tackle the details of the deterrence literature.

The definitional problem is easier to understand if it is approached using the precise distinction between retaliation and denial as military strategies. Retaliation involves the infliction of punishment on an opponent in response to an attack. The punishment need not take place within the same area as the Attack that provoked it; the main purpose is to inflict reciprocal cost. The threat of nuclear bombardment that the super powers hold against each other in the event of nuclear attack is a clear example of retaliatory policy. Denail involves direct resistance by force to the attempt of another to attack areas that are under others control. The essence of denial is to block an attack by physical opposition to the forces making it. The effort by NATO to mount armed forces in Europe sufficient to stop a conventional invasion by the Soviet Union is a Denial policy. In military terms, denial and

defense have identical meanings; both terms reflect the clear distinction between denial and retaliation (Buzan, 1987:135).

The essence of deterrence is the making of military threats in order to prevent another actor from taking aggressive actions. It is about stopping unwanted actions before they occur. Nothing in that definition restricts the threats to retaliation. There is no reason why the threat of a heavy defense cannot fulfill the requirements of deterrence. Therefore, deterrence encompasses both denial and retaliation (Ibid, 136). It is proper opposite is not defense but compellence, Which is the active use of force either to make your opponent do something, or stop him from continuing action that is already underway (Schelling,1966:69).

In short, the logic of deterrence is a statement of a strategic end, retaliation and defense or denial describes two different ways of pursuing that end. If deterrence is purely retaliatory, then its logic leads to the rejection of strategic defenses, but if it includes denial, then it may well be rational to deploy strategic defenses (Buzan, 1987:139).

III.II.III. The US – USSR Nuclear Rivalry: The Road towards Nuclear Proliferation
The nuclear weapons are devices that possess enormous destructive potential that uses energy derived from nuclear fusion reactions. Starting with the scientific breakthroughs of the 1930s which made their development possible, continuing through the nuclear arms race and nuclear testing of the Cold War, and finally with the questions of proliferation (Geoffrey, 2001: 399).

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The first fission weapons, also known as atomic bombs were developed by the United States during World War II in what was called the Manhattan Project. In August 1945 two were dropped on Japan. An international team was dispatched to help work on the project. The Soviet Union started development shortly thereafter with their own atomic bomb project and not long after that both countries developed even more powerful fusion weapons also called hydrogen bombs. During the Cold War, these two countries each acquired nuclear weapons arsenals numbering in the thousands, placing many of them onto rockets which could hit targets anywhere in the world (Morton, 1957:175).

Nuclear weapons were at the center of U.S. national security policy for more than 50 years. From the end of World War II, and, particularly, from the first explosion of a Soviet nuclear weapon in 1949, until the end of the Cold War in 1991the United States relied on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression and forestall the outbreak of a global war between the United States and the Soviet Union (Orme, 1997:458).

The United States sought to maintain nuclear and conventional capabilities sufficient to convince any potential aggressor that the costs of aggression would exceed any potential gains that he might achieve. The Soviet Union was the only nation that could pose a global challenge to U.S. allies' interests and threaten to cause massive destruction in the United States. Other nations, such as China and Soviet allies in Eastern Europe were included in the U.S. nuclear war plans, but the Soviet threat dominated U.S. defense planning. Nuclear forces were sized to deter the Soviet threat; these were then thought to be sufficient to deter or respond to the lesser included cases of threats from other nations (Casper, 1984:27). Although there were often debates about the numbers and types of weapons that the United

States should deploy in its nuclear arsenal, there was little doubt, or debate, among analysts, experts, and government officials about the need for the United States to deter the Soviet threat (Ibid,27).

The U.S continued the development of its nuclear capabilities focusing, in the first years succeeding the war, on developing its B-36 convair bomber so as enabling it to carry more powerful nuclear bombs. On 29 August 1949, the Soviet Union carried out for the first time, a nuclear bomb test in "Simi Ballatnesk" in Kazakhstan. It came as a surprise for the U.S which did not imagine the Soviets would be able to build a nuclear arsenal so quickly bearing in mind the scientists at Manhattan project had warned the white house that the soviet union would be able to produce nuclear weapons in future. These were allegations that the Soviet Intelligence Service could obtain the breadlines for designing the aggregate nuclear weapons. The first bomb was a very similar edition of the implosion method bombs like those dropped on Nagasaki.

Tension began to prevail in the white house which decided to shift supervision on the nuclear weapons from the American Army to a special committee which was called the Atomic Energy committee in precaution of any individual decision by the army leadership to use the nuclear bombs. Consequently, the U.S began to support loyal west European governments enabling them to build up a nuclear arsenal. The U.K carried out its first nuclear test in the year 1952 while France followed in 1960. Despite both countries arsenals were smaller than the Soviet Union yet their being close geographically to the Soviet Union was an important strategic factor in the Cold War (Richelson, 2006:50).

A new phase of nuclear proliferation as a means of strategic defense during the Cold War began on May 1957 when the Soviet Union succeeded in developing trans- continents missiles carrying nuclear thus causing panic in the American governments. John Kennedy, in his presidential campaign, employed this development by declaring that the Soviet Union was far ahead the U.S in producing missiles. He therefore pledged to put developing American missiles on top of the list of his priorities, he was elected president, following his election, he developed missiles technology bridging the gap which was threatening U.S security in the eyes of the American administration. Most people believe that the world will become a more dangerous one as nuclear weapons spread. The chances that nuclear weapons will be fired in anger or accidentally exploded in a way that prompts a nuclear exchange are limited, though unknown. Those chances increase as the number of nuclear states increase. Most people also believe that the chances that nuclear weapons will be used vary with the character of the nuclear states—their sense of responsibility, preference toward commitment to the *status quo,* political and administrative capability (Waltz, 1981:171). States seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means; if they do not face these threats, they will remain non nuclear states (Deutch, 1992:124-125).

III.III.Case Studies: The Berlin, the Cuban, and the Czechoslovakia Crises

III.III.I. The Berlin Crises

A) Background of the Crisis

The Eisenhower administration policy was meant to make West Germany the focus or bulwark of US containment policy against the USSR on the European continent. This was, in essence, the US foreign policy goal with regard to West Germany from 1945 onwards: To use West Germany as an ally in the containment of the USSR. But before this policy could be openly declared and followed, West Germany had first to be integrated into the US military, economic and political alliance system or framework. This policy shift necessitated treating West Germany as a partner and ally rather than as an occupied foe. What occurred in 1954 was the granting of full sovereignty to West Germany by the US followed similarly by the Soviet Union to grant full sovereignty to East Germany (GDR). On October 23, 1954, the Paris Protocols mandated the end of the military occupation of West Germany and its admission into NATO. West Germany was also admitted into the reconstructed Western European Union. On May 5, 1955, with the occupation of West Germany officially ended and on May 9, the country became a member of NATO. The Soviets on the other hand, responded with the signing of the Warsaw Pact Treaty on May 14 of that year. The Warsaw Pact was a military alliance that the Soviet Union established to counter NATO. Hence, two opposed military blocs or alliances emerged in central Europe whereby West Germany was a member of NATO and East Germany was a member of the Warsaw Pact (Ninkovich, 1995:81-88).

With the defeat of the EDC plan and the admission of West Germany into NATO, the US assumed full responsibility for the defense of Western Europe. Under the EDC plan, the goal was to create a united western Europe that would act as a third force in international affairs along with the US and USSR. The NATO plan precluded such a third bloc.

West Berlin became the "trip wire" for any possible new war between the superpowers. Surrounded by Soviet and East German troops, West Berlin was vulnerable. For the Soviets, it allowed East Germans to immigrate to West Germany (Schwartz, 1991: 67).

B) Nuclear Deterrence: The New Look

The central policy of the Eisenhower administration adopted was based on nuclear deterrence (massive retaliation) through the reliance on atomic weapons to deter Soviet expansion into Western Europe. The policy was known as the New Look. To counter overwhelming Soviet troop strength in Europe, the US would have to deploy ground troops in Europe as necessitated by the NATO alliance because the US had now assumed primary responsibility for the defense of Western Europe.

Eisenhower wanted to avoid the massive expenditure needed for such a deployment. The cost-effective approach adopted was to equip US forces with tactical nuclear weapons. Eisenhower announced: "In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions" (Schwartz, 1991: 67). In December, 1957, NATO authorized the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons would

compensate for NATO's conventional inferiority to the Warsaw Pact in Europe, they would be the equalizer.

West Germany was supposed to amass an army of 500,000 troops for the Bundeswehr when it entered NATO. But by the end of 1956, only a force of 67,000 had been assembled. By the end of 1959, this number had been increased to 230,000. This glaring lack of ground troops on the part of NATO necessitated a reliance on atomic weapons. Fears of an atomic war in central Europe with such a policy entailed prompted Polish foreign minister Adam Rapacki to propose the creation of a nuclear free zone in central Europe. The threat of nuclear war became heightened as crises intensified between the US and USSR.

The crisis point was Berlin. The Soviet leader then, Nikita Khrushchev wanted an end to the Potsdam treaty mandate of four-power administration of the city. During the decade, East Germany had lost up to two million citizens to emigration. They fled East Germany through West Berlin. This drain on East Germany was becoming critical. From 1958 to 1963, Khrushchev sought to resolve the issue of the division of Berlin. Berlin was a microcosm of the wider US-USSR conflict in Germany. As during the Berlin Blockade and Airlift the decade before, the second Berlin crisis took the two superpowers again to the brink of all-out nuclear war (Bundy, 1988: 78).

C) The Second Berlin Crisis, 1958-1963

In November, 1958, Nikita Khrushchev proposed to the US that a new treaty needed to be signed between the US, USSR, UK, and France that would redefine the status of Berlin.

The Soviet plan proposed a "free city" of Berlin. The city was divided between a West and East sector, the West zone being part of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), West Germany. Initially, it was under four-power administration as mandated by the Potsdam agreement of 1945.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the divided status of Berlin was an anomaly and an anachronism. West Berlin was about 110 miles inside East Germany. Most importantly, West Berlin was the easiest way to emigrate out of East Germany and into West Germany. The Soviets and the GDR sought to prevent this refugee crisis. This is what motivated the "second Berlin crisis" (Bundy, 1988:157-162). Because the conflict had become "nuclearized" and because of the 1957 launch of Sputnik, which demonstrated that the USSR could launch projectiles even into space, the threat of nuclear war was paramount.

According to Bundy, the second Berlin crisis was a "single phenomenon" defined by Khrushchev and "was a Soviet exercise in atomic diplomacy" (Bundy, 1988:78). Khrushchev was using the credible threat of nuclear weapons to force a change in the status quo in Berlin. Eisenhower was willing to negotiate the status of Berlin and was in favor of creating a "free city" so long as all of Berlin was included, not merely West Berlin.

The 1960 Paris Summit between Khrushchev and Eisenhower was descend, however, after the infamous U-2 affair involving the Soviet shoot-down of a U-2 spy plane and the capture of pilot Gary Powers (Ninkovich, 1945: 81-88). The Berlin crisis remained unresolved with the election of President John F. Kennedy in 1960. Kennedy's policy on Germany was at

once similar and different to that of Eisenhower. But he favored a greater reliance on conventional strength.

Kennedy appointed Dean Acheson to head a senior advisory group that would make new policy recommendations with regard to Berlin. Acheson recommended that American ground forces in Germany should be increased by two to three divisions and that US reserves should be increased. In 1961, Khrushchev and Kennedy met in Vienna to discuss the Berlin crisis. But nothing resulted from these discussions. The refugee flow was reaching unbearable proportions for the GDR: 30,000 refugees per month were fleeing into West Berlin, 4,000 on August 12, 1961 alone. On August 13, 1961, the East Germans began constructing a wire fence around West Berlin that would be replaced with the Berlin Wall. It would become the symbol of the division and confrontation between the US and USSR during the Cold War. It demonstrated an impasse and a stalemate, the lack of a solution.

The Berlin Wall would embody and symbolize the division between not only East and West Berlin, between East and West Germany, but also between the US and USSR, between the two camps in the Cold War. US foreign policy between 1949 and 1961 in Central Europe consisted of containing the Soviet Union by integrating West Germany in the US military alliance system, which became NATO.

The US policy goal was always the containment of the Soviet Union. The only issue was how to achieve this. The US always sought to use West Germany as an ally partner in this containment policy against the USSR. But before this could be openly done, West Germany

first had to be integrated into the US alliance system by demilitarization, decartelization, and democratization (Ninkovich, 1995:113-118).

Beginning in 1950, especially after the Korean War, US policy shifted to integrating West Germany in the US military alliance network. What resulted was the inclusion of West Germany in NATO, a military pact led by the US, which integrated West Germany into the organization, whose goal was the containment of the USSR in Western Europe. This is how US policy sought to rectify the problem of a power vacuum created in Central Europe following the military defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 (Leffler,1992:42).

III.III.II. Cuban Missile Crises

The Cuban missile crisis was a confrontation between the United States of America, the Soviet Union, and Cuba during the Cold War. In Russia, it is called the "Caribbean Crisis," while in Cuba it is called the "October Crisis." The crisis ranks with the Berlin Blockade as one of the major confrontations of the Cold War, and is often regarded as almost universally as the closest call ever to all-out nuclear war. The inadvertent slide to that confrontation is thus the superpowers joint burden of nuclear responsibility. Together, they put the world at greater risk of nuclear catastrophe than at any time before or since (Blight, 1995:232).

The story of the 13-day crisis starting from the morning of 16 October 1962, when National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy brought to President John F. Kennedy some photographs, taken by high-flying U-2 spy planes, that showed Soviet troops engaged in setting up nuclear-capable missile sites in Cuba. Frankel describes the crisis as rooted in the

complementary miscalculations of Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The American President mistakenly believed that the USSR would never deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba; the Soviet leader believed that the Americans would agree if they were deployed and presented as a fait accompli (Frankel, 2004: 206).

Explanations varied as to why the Soviet leader had taken his decision to install intermediate and medium- range nuclear missiles in Cuba which could threaten most American cities. Some analysts referred Khrushchev's decision to an American threat to topple the communist's regime in Cuba. Others saw that the Soviet leader's motives stemmed from a wish to further the Soviet Union's strategic ambition. A third explanation went to attribute Khrushchev's decision to an end of opening domestic critics inside the Soviet Union (Young and Kent, 2004:234).

Undoubtedly, the first idea that Khrushchev was concerned about the threat of toppling the communist regime in Cuba is true to some extent. It is likely that the Soviet leader was attracted by the ideas of appearing to gain strength relative to the U.S particularly as he was desperately concerned to cover up the military and economic weakness of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev was particularly concerned about Soviet weakness in nuclear terms and the reality was less important than the perception of it. There was indeed an enormous missile gap bit in favor of the U.S which was revealed by the assistant secretary of defense, Roswell Gilpatric, in August 1961.

Khrushchev's was almost certainly embarrassed by this revelation even though it was done in a relatively unobtrusive manner. Those, in the Soviet Union who wanted a more hard-

time assertive policy towards the west, were keen to increase military expenditure. He hoped that by using Berlin as a pressure point on the west, he could gain concessions that would be regarded as Soviet achievements and a justification for his foreign policy. Unfortunately his Berlin policy resulted in no changes in the status-quo in Berlin or in the position of East Germany.

Under such circumstances, there was a bad need for a successful Soviet initiative in order to silence domestic critics and to enhance the Soviet position as a great world power and leader of the communist movement. Attempting to score a nuclear success over the Americans was enormous even if it was more apparent than real (Young and Kent, 2004:234).

Khrushchev could justify his Cuban policy by the fact that the Americans had similar Jupiter missiles in position right on the Soviet door steps in Turkey. On these grounds it might have been reasonable to conclude that the Americans would find it hard to take a strong line in opposition to the arrivals of missiles in Cuba. There was also a point concerning the idea of Kennedy as a weak president lacking in experience. Such perceptions could have been based on Kennedy handling of the Bay of Pigs crisis in 1961.

The Bay of Pigs was an ill- conceived plan to launch an invasion of Cuban exiles to depose Castro. Kennedy was faced with the choice between using air power and accepting the failure of the assault but he chooses the latter (Hilsman, 1996:1).

Kennedy was intimidated by Khrushchev at their summit in Vienna in June 1961. Kennedy made peaceful overtures concerning Laos. Why therefore should the American president react by confronting the Soviets over nuclear weapons in Cuba? After all, when in July 1960 Khrushchev had spoken of Soviet missiles perhaps one day being used to defend Cuba he received no response, unlike over Berlin when the U.S had always made its position clear (Young and Kent, 2004:235).

A) The Crisis

As mentioned before that the crisis began on 16 October when Kennedy saw U2 pictures of Soviet missile sites on Cuba that had been taken two days before. However, the immediate origins of the crisis and the explanation of the installation's Impact on the Americans goes back to April 1962 when Khrushchev decided on their deployment (Frankel, 2004: 206).

The deployment was not only to be done in secret, but the Americans were subsequently lied to about Soviet intentions, which was disturbing to the Kennedy administration. It was two days before the president examined the photos of the sight that McGeorge Bundy had asserted there was no likelihood of the Soviets acquiring a major offensive capability in Cuba. This was the last statement by the administration based on Khrushchev's denying the Soviets had any intention to install surface-to-surface missiles and equip Cuba as an offensive base, which the president had warned against (Young and Kent, 2004:238).

When the reality was revealed, whatever U.S assessments of the strategic or symbolic importance, the sense of resentment was enhanced by an awareness of Khrushchev's deception. Kennedy initial reaction was along the lines that the U.S would have to do

something in response. To take an action was reinforced by Kennedy's sense of his domestic position and his beliefs that he was vulnerable to blame of weakness in terms of anti communism and American defenses.

The president was also convinced that the crisis was connected to the situation in Berlin where the Soviet held the military cards and could use the missiles in Cuba to further putting pressure on the Americans in Berlin. But at all events the question will be what kind of response the United States should take (Allyn, Blight, Welch, 1990: 136-172).

The essential requirement of any action was the removal of the missiles, even though Kennedy and McNamara believed their presence was a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo (Kennedy, 1962a: 807). The American put several options to achieve this goal: an air strike, a nuclear attack or a full- scale invasion of Cuba.

It was Robert McNamara who suggested the ideas of quarantine on further Soviet shipments to Cuba as a means of exercise pressure for the removal of the missiles (Frankel, 2004: 206). This action would place the Soviets in a difficult situation where they might have to be the first to use force to beat the naval quarantine. In the Excom 11 members were in favor of the quarantine option while six voted for an air strike.

Kennedy gave up the idea of an air-strike and ordered a strict quarantine on the shipment of military equipment to Cuba. And if necessary, further military action would be taken while the US armed forces had been instructed to prepare for any possibility. And he would regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western

Hemisphere as an attack on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union (Kennedy, 1962:800).

The U.S response was dictated by the need not to look week in the face of Khrushchev's challenge to the status- quo in the western hemisphere. Accepting the missiles the Soviet leader would believe that the Americans would agree if they were deployed and presented as a fait accompli which would give the impression of growing Soviet strength and increasing American vulnerability (Frankel, 2004: 206).

Khrushchev's initially responded by denouncing the interference with vessels on the high seas as unjustified, and an action which constituted a threat to stability, but Kennedy had wrested the initiative away from the Soviet leader. When the crunch came some Soviet ships stopped and one tanker carrying a non military cargo was allowed through. The following morning Kennedy received a message from Khrushchev accusing him of practicing banditry and pushing mankind to the brink of nuclear War.

As Khrushchev continued to refuse concession on the missile the suggestion was a tradeoff between Soviet missiles in Cuba and American missiles in Turkey. Such a deal while eminently sensible had the disadvantage of appearing to give concessions to the Soviets. On the other hand, to start a nuclear war for the sake of preserving some obsolete missiles in turkey might not be the most popular action either.

The world continued to wait as ships bound for Cuba were intercepted on 26 October and the US navy force six Soviet submarines to the surface but there were no signs of the

missiles being removed from Cuba. Next day Kennedy received another letter from Khrushchev in which the Soviet leader accused the US of threatening him with war. Khrushchev suggested that if the US would guarantee not to invade Cuba, the question of armaments would disappear. About the same time a public letter received from Khrushchev that he would remove the missiles from Cuba if the United States removed the missiles in turkey and guarantee not to invade Cuba.

The U.S faced a new difficulty because accepting the deal Khrushchev would have gained the removal of the missiles in Turkey. And if the U.S refused it what could Washington reasonably do if Khrushchev went ahead with developing the missile sites with material already in Cuba? Would it mean an invasion of Cuba would fellow? The president then came to two key decisions. The first was that the U.S could not invade Cuba to remove missiles that they could have taken out by agreeing to remove obsolete missiles from Turkey. The second was to follow McGeorge Bundy's suggestion of replying to the first private letter from Khrushchev, and not the second public one, in other words the basis of the public deal would be that the Soviets would remove the missiles if the U.S gave a guarantee not to invade Cuba. Khrushchev would not have gained anything at the expense of the Americans but could save face by claiming to have protected Cuba from invasion (Allyn, Blight, Welch, 1990: 205).

This in fact formed the public basis of the agreement although it was buttressed by a commitment made to the Soviet ambassador by Robert Kennedy. This involved an assurance that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be withdrawn in the near future an assurance.

This commitment could not be part of a public deal because of how it would reflect on the United States which emerged from the crisis having apparently been successful in resisting Khrushchev's brinkmanship. It appeared to have prevented any advantages accruing to the Soviets whether apparent or real. Yet while Kennedy resisted the options which presented the greater threat to stability he also engaged in brinkmanship in order to avoid the impression of weakness or conceding any advantage to the Soviets. In terms of credibility and the assertion of US nuclear power in the face of a Soviet Challenge, in this way the United States had preserved its superiority and made clear that Khrushchev's intimidation was essentially bluff and bridle.

The risks that were run, and indeed the reasons for running them, have probably both been overstated. At the end neither leader was likely to have ordered a nuclear strike for the sake of what was more apparent than actual strategic benefits. Yet there were risks not just from those in Washington whose were prepared to be more assertive than the president. There was the danger of local commanders seizing the initiative and dragging their superiors into a conflict they would have wanted at all costs to avoid. The flaws in the decision making process and the chain of command could have led to a nuclear clash because of the level of brinkmanship and despite the politicians desire to avoid any such conflict (Young and Kent, 2004:240).

B) The aftermath of the crisis

The consequences of the crisis were felt both locally and internationally and had a profound impact on the future nature of the Cold War. There was a need to avoid the Cold War

turning into a hot one. The Cuban Missile Crisis made the U.S accept that no longer should American foreign policy aim at the eventual removal of the Soviet Union or even seek to prevent the Soviets being fully accepted as a great power. Peaceful coexistence certainly now meant more to both Moscow and Washington and efforts were made between them.

The hot line was established between these two Capitals to prevent more confrontations in which it was difficult for rather side to back down. The fears provoked by the Cuban crisis led to a process of controlling and limit the growing numbers of nuclear Weapons (Young and Kent, 2004:241).

Starting with the Test Ban Treaty in 1965 and leading via the 1968 Non- proliferation Treaty to SALT 1 in 1972.However, other lessons were drawn at the time. For the Americans the crisis reinforced the value of nuclear superiority whereas, for the Soviets the need to achieve nuclear parity became an outcome of equality with the Americans in order to avoid another humiliating climb down (Ibid, 242).

While in the early 1960s it was the Americans that led the way in producing more armaments in the late 1960s, the Soviets outpaced them in the acquision of arms. More weapons rather than fewer remained the order of the day even if this could be justified in the name of deterrence which remains questionable. Whether this was responsible for the disastrous long term decline of the weak Soviet economy is an arguable point. More immediately Khrushchev's position within the Soviet communist party was certainly weakened, although his removal from power would take another two years and follow the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons (Young and Kent, 2004:236).

With regard to the local situation the effect was not what the Americans would have desired. In effect they had placed the Cold War goal of appearing as more powerful and credible than the Soviet on a nuclear issue above the Cold War goal of preventing the spread of left-wing revolutionary ideas in the western hemisphere. By guaranteeing not to remove Castro by Overt means they had limited their ability to cut off the source of communist propaganda and assistance. As a result while Castro was furious with Moscow for agreeing to the removal of the weapons he probably emerged slightly more secure as a result (Allyn, Blight, Welch, 1990: 207).

In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, the relation between the two super powers entered a new phase. The aftermath of the crisis was not the first time that the U.S and the Soviet Union can be regarded as having made an effort to improve relations. Nor was it the time when consideration was first given to the advantages of peaceful coexistence. However, the issue after 1962 was whether the existence of nuclear weapons had combined with the realization that in the climate of unrestricted competition new approaches had to be adapted to the Cold War and Soviet- American relations. If so, these would have to be based on a greater acceptance of the other side as a power with which coexistence was desirable (Young and Kent, 2004:236).

The more someone can see of the Cuban missile crisis, the more it appears as compromise rather than an American victory, each side has been willing to make concessions to avoid venturing too near the brink of war.

Kennedy was not willing to with hold all inducement and push the Russians as hard as he could if this required using force or even continuing the volatile confrontation. It has been common to attribute these effects to the existence of nuclear weapons. Because neither side could successfully protect itself in all-out war, no one could win. But this does not mean that wars will not occur. It is rational to start a war one does not expect to win, if it is believed that the likely consequences of not fighting are even worse. War could also come through loss of control, or irrationality. But if decision makers are sensible stability is the most likely outcome. Furthermore, nuclear weapons can explain super powers caution. When the cost of seeking excessive gains is an increased probability of total destruction, moderation, make sense (Jervis, 1988:87).

With Nuclear weapons political leaders worry not about what may happen in the first phase of fighting but about what may happen in the end. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis said that" it isn't the first step that concerns me," but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth step and we don't go to the sixth because there is no one around to do so" (Waltz, 1990:95).

Furthermore, the possibility that escalation could occur even though neither side desires this outcome, what Schelling calls "the threat that leaves something to chance" (Schelling, 1960:92-125). Induces caution in crises as well. The fact that sharp confrontation can get out of control, leading to the eventual destruction of both sides, means that states will trigger them only when the incentives to do so are high. Of course, crises in the conventional era could escalate, but the possibility of quick and total destruction means that the risk, while struggling near the brink, of falling into the abyss is greater and harder to

control than it was in the past. Fears of this type dominated the bargaining during the Cuban missile crisis: Kennedy's worry was "based on fear, not of Khrushchev's intention. But of human error, of something going terribly wrong down the line." Thus when Kennedy was told that a U-2 had made a navigational error and was flying over Russia, he commented: "There is always some so-and – who does not get the world" (Schlesinger, 1978:221). The knowledge of these dangers which does not seem lacking on the Soviet side as well is a powerful force for caution.

III.III.III. Czechoslovakia Crises

Czechoslovakia was, under the leadership of Antonin Novotny after 1953, one of the most stable countries in the East block and one who communism was maintained without the presence of Soviet troops (withdrawn in late 1945). But the harshness of the regime and the stagnation of economic growth in the early 1960s Doubts about Novotny's were created on his leadership within the communist party.

A relaxation of censorship, rehabilitation of some former anti-Stalinists, and improved growth rates failed to satisfy his critics. In January 1968 Alexander Dubcek replaced Novotny. Thus the country turned from being a conventional communist state to being of deep concern of the Kremlin.

Dubcek was a loyal Marxist-Leninist. He and his fellow reformers hoped to improve the Czechoslovakia system by breaking with the Stalinists past, decentralizing decision-making, introducing market elements into the economy, and allowing non- communist organizations to form publication of anti- communist views, spearheaded by literary pages,

first issued on 29 February 1968, by a group that included the poet Vaclav Havel and which wanted to form a legal opposition party. Consequently, immediate divisions among Dubcek's communist supporters had been provoked. Those supporters began to argue about the scale, pace and areas of reform (Young and Kent, 2004:317).

At an Eastern bloc summit in Dresden, Brezhnev and other leaders expressed concern at Dubcek's reform programme, pointing out the dangers of losing control of events. Yet over the following few months open opposition to the regime, including frequent popular demonstrations, continued and on 4-5 may Dubcek who was criticize by Brezhnev again, this time at a meeting in Moscow. It was in the wake of this meeting that Dubcek decided to call a party congress, to put his authority behind a moderate reform program purging both Stalinists and radicals. But the Soviet military had already begun to plan for a possible intervention in Czechoslovakia and on May8, 1968 during a meeting between Brezhnev, East German, polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian leaders, at which Brezhnev criticized Dubcek as weak, inexperienced, and unreliable. Despite the fact that there were divisions within the East bloc states, on one hand, and inside the Soviet leadership, on the other, as regards to a Soviet military intervention. Among the group of five, only Kadar tried to defend the Czechoslovakian leader, while Ulbricht (of East Germany) and Zhivkov (for Bulgaria) urged action to restore order, if necessary by force. Within the Kremlin, too, there were divisions, with Kosygin was ready to deal with Dubcek, while others increasingly concerned at events.

The second group included the Ukrainian communist leader, petro shelast, who feared strife spreading over the Czechoslovakian border into the Ukraine; the KGB, who also feared for

Soviet internal security and believed NATO could Exploit the Czechoslovakian situation; and the military, led by Marshal Ustinov, who had been keen to station nuclear forces on Czechoslovakia and feared a breach in Warsaw pact defenses. Brezhnev was unsure about intervention, but, significantly, a group of conservatives in Prague led by the Slovakian communists, vasil Bilak began to provide Moscow with information.

Military Maneuvers were begun by the Warsaw pact but Dubcek was not easily frightened. In many ways Dubcek was naïve in his dealing with Russians, he played a political game based on the belief that the Soviets would not intervene (Shawcross, 1990:183-9). He believed his reforms were very popular in Czechoslovakia, and the soviets too divided on how to respond for him. For military action to be an easy option, he tried to seize every opportunity to emphasize its loyalty to the Warsaw pact (Windsor and Roberts, 1968:19).

The invasion, launched on 20-21 August under the codename' operation Danube' was Accomplished by a domestic coup, led by Bilak and other conservatives. As one American diplomat speculated," That is perhaps why the invader came with the claim of having been invited to rescue the country" (Skoug, 1999:141). However, the domestic side of the operation was ruined because Dubcek managed to retain both popular sympathy and majority support at a long meeting of the ruling presidium. The Soviet was forced to arrest Dubcek and other leaders whom they obliged to agree to the country's normalizations as a loyal member of the Soviet bloc. Soon Gustav Husak emerged as an alternative to Dubcek.

Operation Danube brought half a million troops into Czechoslovakia from the group of five by the end of August, a force large enough to prevent any armed response and ensuring a

law casualty rate of about 100 Czechoslovakians. The red Army stayed in the country until 1991. The operation was opposed and was met by a widespread passive resistance campaign which harmed economic output and undermined the Soviet claim to be acting in the interests of the Czechoslovakia masses. Dubcek remained in office until April 1969. He began the "normalization" process by restoring censorship, centralizing control under the party and ending all public signs of factionalism within the government. One of the significant features of the Prague Spring was that the Communist Party itself had not only remained strong, but was joined by many would-be reformers.

Dubcek successor, Husak purged the communist party of reformers and by 1970 had ended all signs of dissent. Therefore, the international price that the USSR had to pay for intervention was similarly short-lived. The invasion also had a predictably detrimental impact on Soviet relations with the western powers, who roundly condemned it. There was also a double impact on détente: first the cancellation of President Johnson's summit with Brezhnev, and second because the Soviets themselves were unwilling to pressure détente while their alliance bloc appeared so divided. However, in the immediate term, it has been argued that NATO's policy not only failed to prevent the Soviet invasion, but may have encouraged it by giving Soviet leaders a high degree of confidence that they could move into Czechoslovakia with a free hand (Mcginn, 1999:136).

After running down the list of crises in Soviet-American relations since the end of World War II, we can see how many occasions there have been in relations between Washington and Moscow that in almost any other age, and among any other antagonists, would sooner

or later have produced war. Thus great care was taken on both sides to avoid incidents that might have triggered hostilities (Jones, 1985: 154-184).

No new world war resulted from any of these events is largely due to the existence of nuclear weapons, and the deterrent effect which their possession and deployment had on the actions of the major powers throughout the Cold War. The fear of the nuclear weapons made both countries deterred by a mutual fear of escalation to a general war in which the level of nuclear destruction to the civilian infrastructure and population would be exceed any possible gain for either side (Delvoie, 2002:66).

Because of the nuclear weapons the United States was not in a position to prevent the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and considered the matter an internal issue. Czechoslovakia was too important to be allowed to escape from Soviet control. Kun quoted a Soviet general who said that the Soviet Union was going into Czechoslovakia "even if it means the outbreak of a third world war "(Dresen, 1999: 2).

To this end, the above cases reveal that the heated political escalations failed to trigger direct military confrontation between two superpowers which is primarily – by no means the only factor- due to effect deterrence and nuclear supremacy of both states. In other words, it can be argued that a state of stability was established owing mainly to such valuable strategic instrument. Within he course of discussions, the next chapter will along the lines examine stability as such – as a policy political outcome taking into account the above-mentioned findings.

Chapter IV

The Road towards Stability

The aim of this chapter is based in two main grounds. First, it will try to examine to which extent the empirical analysis coincide with the theoretical themes discussed in chapter one. Second, the chapter shall attempt to answer the main question of the research – based on the above-mentioned findings- to envisage the degree to which nuclear deterrence during the Cold War – conditioned by technological advancement - succeeded in shaping international politics then by promoting the non state of war between the two main superpowers and as a result fostering stability per se.

As for the formal, the paper concludes that realism is highly deemed the ideal school of thought that succeeded in explaining the said antagonistic four case scenarios during the Cold War with only little liberalism bent (short-term diplomacy played at the zenith of the crises). As shown in the following section, theoretical issues related to balance of power signified by reciprocal mutual nuclear advancement boosted deterrence capability between the competing powers. Accordingly, it can be argued that realism can also be viewed as a theory of order and stability as well. However, it worth noting here, that the paper understand the significant of a number of liberalism principles and themes in easing conflict between the superpowers through the short-term role of diplomacy and secret negotiations only at the climax of the said crises. Unlike the above scenario (1958-1968), the aftermath of the 1968 Czechoslovakian crises (arms control conventions during détente period), the relations witnessed an open and direct negotiations but within broader approach towards diplomatic route.

As for the latter however, the paper contends that nuclear weapons was an indispensable factor towards preventing direct conflict and promoting stability alike between the then two superpowers particularly during the period of 1958-1968. Indeed, the fear of retaliation based on mutual assured destruction had neutralized any strategic option by either power to consider any military confrontation regardless how volatile the situation was.

Though, before commencing these investigations, it worth unleash those complexities surrounding the concept of stability as such as so that to better comprehend the nature of stability was established during the Cold War and those pillars and grounds that assisted to attain such notion.

IV.I. Understanding Stability within Nuclear Deterrence Framework

Despite circulation of the stability phenomenon in the social theory and the political thought and its practical application, yet specialists differ as regards a unified definition for the stability as well as its indications. Definitions were multiple while approaches of tackling this phenomenon varied, from a researcher to another. It should have found its explanation in the multiplication of the cognitive, systematic and ideological starts directing the researcher's perspectives in this subject. Thus making a given researcher liable to opt for its acceptance or amending its contents (Abdelqader, 1983:24-42).

According to the language lexicons for example, stability is derived from (karra/or settled) in the place or re- the matter; meaning fixed and resided as if an expression of the action preceding stability and quietness (Maloof, 1956:237). Where in English, the American

heritage lexicon abridged the meanings of stability as being," the resistance of the sudden changes as well as maintaining equilibrium". Meanwhile, the scientific and societal lexicons add descriptive dimensions for the concept thus defining the social stability as "subsistence of the social stereotypes in the society without any sudden or genuine change at any aspect of such stereotypes" (Morrise, 1981:442).

As far social science is concerned, the concept also spawned widespread contested controversies in defining the concept. From sociology perspective for instance, scholars generally add a denotation for the concept in term of " the continuity of the social and cultural samples at a local or a grand society without exposing such samples to a sudden change thus the social stability does not necessarily mean a state of consistency prevailing in the society despite that the stable society (if existed) should be stable (Atef, 1988:350-425-46). In parallel, another sociologist famous scholar, Parsons Talcott used the concept of stability as being the awareness of the social environment as a synonym to the concept of equilibrium which in other cases could be fixed or changeable (Talkot, 1984:131-145).

The consecution of stability and balancing in parson's definition seem as relation of dependency leading consequently to depriving each concept its peculiarities as regards denotations and expression, a portray unacceptable on the light of evidences pointing to attainment of stability without balance. Therefore stability is not a precondition for attaining the balance but it could be the balance, on its part, is a group of operations leading to the stability.

As for political science is concerned however, Abu Taleb clarifies by saying" if the regime- for instance- was witnessing a state of apparent stability, then the potential sources of tension remain as they are. And whereas the society changes its behavior as well as values, the political regime stands incapable of tolerating such changes with its outcomes and contents. thereafter, the gap widens between the intensity and pressure of change on one hand, and, the continuity of expansion and increase of the standing stability .that resulted from the regimes backwardness to follow up the changes it is exposed to form a structural and functional perspective whose capabilities fall short of creating the efficient instruments to restore symmetry and integration (Al atlawi, 1996:199-211). On the other hand, as for Deutsch and Singer, stability refers to the "probability of their continued political independence and territorial integrity without any significant probability of becoming engaged in a war for survival". And to the "probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur"(Deutsch and Singer, 1964: 390-391). He says that "the system is considered stable or relatively balanced when the relationship between its formulations and the operations carried out in it and its vicinity of the kind that protects those structural peculiarities and relations which, for the sake of the purposes we target, are called "Structural Peculiarities and Relations", meaning that they do not change proportionatly. At the dynamic systems in general such preservation is ever dependant on the changing operations which are alienated. On the other hand, stability is seen in terms of "the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics: That no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur" (Singer and Deutsch, 1969:315-317). And thus,

stability is the capacity for self-regulation: the ability to counteract stimuli that would otherwise threaten its survival (Singer and Deutsch, 1969: 315-317).

To this end, the aforesaid images are deemed beneficial in building upon in order to specify the indicative concept adopted as content for the social and political stability in question. Though, despite the said divergence of interpretations and the widespread of discrepancies of views over defining stability, it appears nonetheless, the common dominators that can draw together these differences to fulfill the connotation of stability - its broadest political and strategic sense - resides in three main grounds: the avoidance of sudden change, maintaining the status quo, and preserving the equilibrium. According, it worth asking here is where these findings are located within the superpowers rivalries context during the Cold War – taking into account the three case studies detailed in previous chapter?

Generally speaking, when examining stability within Cold War context, it maybe recognized that the term stability is not the first episode that comes to mind when one evokes the history of the Cold War era. That period, has seen the greatest accumulation of armaments the world has ever known, a whole series of extended and devastating limited wars, numerous coups and revolutions, endemic ethnic and civil violence, as well as mounting deep ideological rivalries in human experience. However, the sensitivity of these responsive and provocative conditions, were not sufficient enough to trigger direct confrontation between the two superpowers (Gaddis, 1986:235). Indeed it is an interesting and unique phenomenon considering the fact that "For every thousand pages published on the causes of wars, there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" (Blainey, 1973:3). This indeed sounds very logical when realizing the fact where stability as such

depends upon the conscious behavior of the nations that make them up, stability in the Cold War still may not have resulted if there had been, among either of the superpowers in the system the same willingness to risk war that has existed at other times in the system in the past (Gaddis, 1986:257).

Indeed, the above-mentioned common dominators in terms of the avoidance of sudden change, maintaining the status quo, and preserving the equilibrium within strategic study perspective are highly associated with the effective and indispensable role of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. For example, a situation is called stable if the employment of military force is not expected. A political measure is called stabilizing if it reduces the danger of war. In such a general form stability is certainly not an operational concept. There are, however, a number of more tangible concepts for stability which can be used in an operational sense. They describe certain political processes or interactions that could lead to an unintentional use of military force, trolled escalation, or unnecessary damage and measures to avoid them (Heisenberg, 1989:26).

In more specific sense, the U.S MX missile (Peacekeeper missile) would be needed to maintain the stability of deterrence. Without the MX the United States would not be able to match the superior strategic counterforce capability of the larger Soviet missiles. Deployment of the MX missile, a comparatively large ICBM with a large number of nuclear warheads, would obviously violate the criteria for crisis stability used by the Scowcroft Commission to justify the development of a small ICBM as well as by a number of U.S. START proposals. But the Scowcroft Commission report votes for the MX to "remove the Soviet advantage in ICBM capability and to help deter the threat of

conventional or limited nuclear attacks on the alliance (President's Commission report p. 14). Cancellation of the MX program would be perceived as a consolidation of a Soviet counterforce superiority and, therefore, produce a different kind of instability (Ibid, 6). Moreover, Ambassador Jack Matlock, who served as President Ronald Reagan's envoy to Moscow, offered assessed the MX as playing "a very small part" in ending the Cold War and said there were a great many factors that contributed to the conflict's conclusion. Most notable, he said, was the emergence of a new generation of Soviet leaders, led by President Mikhail Gorbachev, who shared Reagan's desire to end the nuclear arms race. For Reagan, the MX was a "negotiating chip" (Matlock, 2005: 2). The report does not explicitly refer to a specific stability concept, but it justifies the MX program as a means for strengthening the effectiveness of deterrence and inducing the Soviet Union to move toward a more stable regime of deployment and arms control. If preventing a nuclear war is the main goal of strategic stabilization, effective mutual deterrence can be perceived as an important criterion for stability (Heisenberg, 1989:3).

Under present conditions an attempt to stabilize nuclear deterrence makes sense only if it aims at extending the political scope of deterrence. Thus the advocates of this concept usually tend to perceive U.S.-Soviet relations as a kind of zero-sum game, in which even a very small political gain can be crucial. In this perception, the risks described by the crisis stability concept seem to be small compared to the possible political losses.

A proponent of crisis stability, on the other hand, would normally describe the U.S.-Soviet political conflict in less dramatic terms. The natural risks of U.S.-Soviet competition are his main concern. From his perspective, the marginal political gains that could be expected

from a further strengthening of nuclear deterrence are not worth the risk if they increase the danger of a serious crisis escalation out of control (Heisenberg, 1989: 34).

Thus, the choice between different concepts of strategic stability obviously depends on the political character of U.S. Soviet relations. In a theoretical situation of total conflict neither side would be willing to accept the restrictions necessarily associated with measures for crisis stability, and unlike the players in some simulations of the prisoner's dilemma, both sides have little flexibility for developing strategies to encourage supportive behavior because their perceptions of the political situation are determined by internal processes beyond their control. However, when conflict does not dominate every aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations, it becomes possible to distinguish between strengthening and stabilizing deterrence. Excessive capabilities for deterrence by denial can be perceived as destabilizing in a political sense, and it becomes easier to accept measures for crisis stability. In such a situation deterrence could be understood as mutual deterrence, and thereby gain an element of mutuality (Heisenberg, 1989:35).

To this end, understanding the logic of stability and its main features with Cold War perspective shall expectedly facilitate the ground for the remaining sections to respond to the main objectives of this chapter. The following section will try to verify the extent to which empirical findings coincides with theoretical themes mentioned in chapter one before involving in exploring the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in promoting stability during the Cold War. In order to do so, the paper recognized the need to investigate the significance of nuclear component in advance the notion of deterrence-stability synthesis.

IV.II. Nuclear Weapons and Stability during the Cold War

Introduction

"a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable" (Bundy, 1969: 9).

The existence of nuclear weapons and the direct evidence of what they can do when used against human beings (Mandelbaum, 1981:58-77), had given the new generation a vivid awareness of the realities of war that no previous generation has had. The nuclear deterrent provides that mechanism. As a result the United States and the Soviet Union have successfully managed a whole series of crises. The development of nuclear weapons has a stabilizing effect on them, they serve to discourage the process of escalation that has in other eras led to war (Gaddis, 1986:277). Nuclear weapons are the most destructive technology ever developed. From the day fission was discovered in 1938, the problem of controlling this technology has been of central importance to the human race. The nuclear weapon was perceived as the absolute weapon, which immediately created the political question of its unsability. As an absolute weapon which can destroy humanity, nuclear systems couldn't be treated like any other weapon. A conceptual effort was made to design a rational political role for something which, by definition, is irrational. This original problem was never resolved, but the temporary solution to it was found in the concept of nuclear deterrence, which eventually was accepted as wisdom, and was the basis for

strategic stability between the Soviet Union and the United States, and for a special regime encompassing the entire international community. At the top level of strategic stability were the United States and the Soviet Union, whose posture was based on the concept of mutually assured destruction or mutual nuclear deterrence. The two superpowers developed the notion of their special privilege, as the owners of 98 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world (Ibid, 278).

The existence of large nuclear stock piles influences superpower politics from three directions: First, the devastation of an all out war would be enormous. Second, neither side would be spared this devastation, because what is significant about nuclear weapons is not "overkill" but mutual kill. Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling and others have noted that no country could win an all out nuclear war (Brodie, 1946:89). Third, the devastation from the nuclear weapons could occur extremely quickly, within a matter of days or even hours, and at any point even in calm times, one side or the other could decide to launch an unprovoked all- out strike, more likely, a crisis could lead to limited uses of force which in turn through a variety of mechanism could produce an all- out war, even if neither side initially wanted this result. The possibility that escalation could occur even though neither side desires this outcome, what Schelling calls" the threat that leaves something to chance" (Schelling, 1960: 92-125) includes caution in crisis as well.

The fact that confrontation can get out of control leading to the eventual destruction of both sides, this means that states will trigger them only when the incentives to do so are extremely high. Of course crisis in the conventional era could escalate, but the possibility of total destruction means that the risk while struggling near the brink of falling into the

abyss is harder to control them than it was in the past. Fears of this type dominated the bargaining during the Cuban missile crisis.

Nuclear weapons make mutual security more feasible than it was in the past, it can also permit the superpowers to adopt military doctrines and bargaining tactics that made it possible for them to take advantage of their shared interest in preserving the status quo (jervis, 1988:87). Deterrence is one of these military doctrines and strategies designed to accomplish a common end in different ways, using deferent weapons differently deployed. Wars can be prevented, as they can be caused in various ways (Waltz, 1990:97).

Nuclear deterrence theory can be seen as an effort to understand how political conflicts of interest play out in the shadow of nuclear weapons. It begins by recognizing that nuclear weapons do not eliminate conflicts of interest. The United States and Soviet Union remained at odds after they acquired nuclear weapons, but the nuclear weapons change the strategic setting in which those conflicts play out. Thus, any crisis between these states poses a risk of spinning out of control and, ultimately, leaving each state far worse off than it would have been had it given in or acquiesced to its adversary's original demands at the outset. For example, the original stakes of a crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union would hardly matter had that crisis ended in a massive nuclear exchange which left both societies in ruins. How does the risk of catastrophic escalation affect the way that political conflicts play out? How and to what extent can states exert coercive pressure on each other in order to further their interests in the shadow of such risk – be those interests to protect what they already have or to acquire more? A handful of scholars including Bernard Brodie, Hermann Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder, and Albert Wohlstetter

tried to answer these questions in the early years of the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence theory grew out of these efforts (Powell, 1990:1).

Over the course of the Cold War, mutual nuclear deterrence built around survivable retaliatory capabilities on both sides, made strategic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union predictably stable (Iklé, 1973:51). Both countries would be deterred from highly provocative behavior by a mutual fear of escalation to a general war in which the level of nuclear destruction to the civilian infrastructure and population would far exceed any possible gain for either side. Consequently, each would avoid provoking the other in the extreme. (Schelling, 1966: 3) Over time, this vision of mutual deterrence stability became so widely accepted that it even brings together a popular name: the balance of terror (Payne, 2006:10).

In the United States, general acceptance of this deterrence paradigm had concrete consequences: stable deterrence came to be defined as mutual capabilities for strategic nuclear retaliation against cities, and strategic forces were categorized based on their expected effect on the balance of terror. Those forces compatible with offensive retaliatory threats to cities and industry were labeled beneficial and stabilizing. Those capable of defending society against such threats, on the other hand, were deemed to be the opposite. This known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), became the prism through which many in the press, Congress, armed services, and Executive Branch thought about and judged strategic forces. It also turned into the organizing principle for U.S. arms control, which became oriented around eliminating destabilizing systems, such as missile defense, while preserving a limited number of good stabilizing offensive nuclear forces. Thus extreme

confidence in Mutual Assured Destruction required specific assumptions about human decision-making, the character of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the context of the Cold War itself. For MAD to work predictably, certain conditions in the U.S.-Soviet relationship had to exist: leaders would communicate in times of crisis well enough to comprehend their respective threats and thresholds for nuclear retaliation; they would conduct a well-informed, unemotional, and rational cost-benefit assessment of the potential consequences of brinkmanship and conflict; and they ultimately would prudently decide that the disincentives to taking provocative actions would outweigh any incentives to the contrary (Payne, 2006:10).

During the Cold War, each of these characteristics simply was assumed to exist in U.S.-Soviet deterrence relations. We chose to believe that Soviet leaders would be "sensible" and calculating after our own fashion, meaning that they would inevitably choose to be cautious in the face of a nuclear threat to cities; that caution was the only "rational" choice and guaranteed deterrence. By viewing Soviet leaders essentially as the mirror images of ourselves, we could take for granted the conditions necessary for stable deterrence, and conclude that it would function reliably (Payne, 2006:11).

Over time, this proposition became a comforting Cold War tautology—the lethality of the strategic nuclear threat ensured deterrence against all but the irrational because only the irrational would not be deterred by the deadliness of strategic nuclear threat. Former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy expressed this view in the light of the certain prospect of retaliation there has been literally no chance at all that any sane political authority, in either the United States or the Soviet Union, would consciously choose to start

a nuclear war, Bundy wrote. "This proposition is true for the past, the present, and the foreseeable future… for sane men on both sides; the balance of terror is overwhelmingly persuasive" (Bundy, 1969: 9). Nuclear deterrence thus was considered easy to understand and to guarantee. It became a simple function of balance. Mutual nuclear threats to cities ensured stable mutual deterrence, and such vulnerability was easy to orchestrate with nuclear weapons (Jervis 1997: 617-618).

Most discussions of deterrence are based on the belief that deterrence is difficult to achieve, In the Eisenhower years, massive retaliation was the phrase used to describe the response the American would make should the Soviet Union attack. Deterrence must be difficult if the threat of massive retaliation is required to achieve it. As the Soviet Union's arsenal grew, mutual assured destruction became the acronym of choice, thus preserving the notion that deterrence depends on being willing and able to destroy much if not most of a country. But in the 1960s, the emphasis was put on the assured destruction. Thus viewed, deterrence becomes a horrible policy, as numerous critics have charged (Waltz, 1990: 3).

The question worth asking here is what would be expected from the United States to do if the Soviet Union then launched a major conventional attack against vital American interests in Western Europe? Military actions have to be related to an objective. But because of the power of nuclear weapons, the pressure to use them in ways that achieve the objective at hand while suffering a minimum of destruction would be massive. It is preposterous to think that if a Soviet attack should break through NATO's defenses, the United States would strike thousands of Soviet military targets or hundreds of Soviet cities. Doing so would serve no purpose. Who would want to make a bad situation worse by launching destructive attacks on a country that can strike back with comparable force, or on a country that could not do so?

They might strike a target or two, military or industrial, chosen to keep casualties low. But if the Soviet Union had run the risk of attacking the center of Europe, believing it could escape retaliation, the Americans would show them they were wrong, while passing on the idea that more will follow if they continue. The purpose of demonstration shots is simply to

remind everyone that catastrophe threatens. And no country gains by destroying other cities and then seeing a comparable number of its own destroyed in return is obvious to everyone Thus deterrence does not depend on destroying cities; it depends on what one can do, not on what one will do. What deters is the fact that we can do as much damage to each other. The country suffering the retaliatory attack cannot limit the damage done. Only the retaliator can do so.

With nuclear weapons, countries need threaten to use only a small amount of force. This is because once the willingness to use little force is shown, so much more can be easily be added. This is not the subject with conventional weapons, and therefore it is often useful for a country to threaten to use a lot of force if conflict should lead to war. With conventional weapons, countries tend to emphasize the first phase of war. Striking hard to achieve a quick victory may decrease the cost of war. With nuclear weapons, political leaders worry not about what may happen in the first phase of fighting but about what may happen in the end. As Clausewitz wrote if war should ever approach the absolute, it would become" imperative…. Not to take the first step without considering what may be the last" (Waltz, 1990:97).

Since war now approaches the absolute, President Kennedy echoed Clausewitz's words during the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962."It is the first step that concerns me," he said," but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth step- and we don't go to the sixth because there is no one around to do so" (Waltz, 1990:98). In conventional crisis, leaders may seek one advantage, thus they can fake it by threatening escalatory steps they are unwilling to take. They may try one trick or another and run considerable risks. Since none of the parties to

the struggle can predict what the outcome will be, they may have good reason to prolong crisis, even crises entailing the risk of war. A conventional country enjoying military superiority is tempted to use it before other countries right the military balance. Nuclear country superiority is reluctant to use it because no one can promise the full success of a disarming first strike. As Henry Kissinger retrospectively said of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union had only"60-70truly strategic weapons while we had something like 2,000 in missiles and bombs."But he added," with some proportion of Soviet delivery vehicles surviving, the Soviet Union do horrendous damage to the united states," we could not be sure that our 2,000 weapons would destroy almost all of their 60 or 70 (Ibid, 99). Even with numbers immensely disproportionate, a small force strongly inhibits the use of large one.

The catastrophe promised by nuclear war distinctions sharply with the extreme difficulty of predicting out comes among conventional competitors. Contemplating war when the use of nuclear weapons is possible focuses one's attention not on the probability of victory but on the possibility of annihilation. Because catastrophic outcomes of nuclear exchanges are easy to imagine, leaders of states will shrink in horror from initiating them. With nuclear weapons, stability rest on easy calculations of what one country can do to another. Anyone can see that catastrophe lurks if events spiral out of control and nuclear warheads begin to fly. Thus the problem of credibility of deterrence, a big worry in conventional world, will disappear in a nuclear one (Waltz, 1981: 171).

In sum, nuclear weapons helped to maintain stability during the cold war and to preserve peace throughout the instability that came in its wake, peace and stability has become the privilege of states having nuclear weapons, while wars are fought by those who lack them.

Nuclear weapons dominate strategy; nothing can be done with them other than to use them for deterrence (Waltz, 1981: 171).

IV.III. Introduction: Assessing Empirical Analysis within Theoretical Context

The following section will try to demonstrate how realism considerably succeeded in explaining US-USSR paradigm during the Cold War (1958-1968) based on two main key strategic grounds: balance of power within bipolar system and nuclear deterrence. Accordingly, realism –within these two focal grounds- is construed a theory of peace and stability. A classical realist scholar, Daniel Defoe, maintains in earlier writing that this connection was explicit in that " a just balance of power is the life of peace" (Maurseth, 1964:29). That's why the balance of power can explain the constant readiness to use and threaten force, but not the actual resort to force. If the balance of power worked as advertised, there will be no war. Perturbations in the balance should be small and generate the pressures that return the system to a stable equilibrium balance of power. On the other hand, liberals nonetheless, view that the prospects for stability, peace and for the elimination of war are based on a preference for democracy, diplomacy, and negotiations.

IV.III.I Realism and Stability within Theoretical – Empirical Synthesis

In general terms, realism uses notions of order, stability, deterrence and the balance of power, to convey its message of constraint and to reify the structure of the international system (Thompson, 1990:65). Thus, according to its proponents, it is seen as an equilibrium theory of stability. This stability is maintained by the working of the balance of power

which emerges from the constant preparation for war and adjustments to shift in capability. If the system worked smoothly, war would be avoided, and war is thus an anomaly, both the perturbation of the equilibrium and departures from it are exogenous to the realism (Stein, 2002: 1).

Neorealist also wrote about the balance of power, in neorealism, for example, the balance of power is an equilibrium stable state (Chatterjee, 1975:70). States are presumed to be simply interested in self- preservation that respond to adverse shifts in the global balance of power (Rosecrance, 1961:222-31), any perturbation in the balances of power generates reactions that return the system to balance. What disturbs any balance is considered outside the theory.

Waltz's balance of power argument mirrors this equilibrium specifically and self-deliberately. Waltz grants that disturbances to any balance of power are originate at the level of the individual, nation states, technological breakthroughs, and individual madmen. These disturbances cannot be explained by any international systems theory. Neo- realism, like any equilibrium theory has admitted the weakness of exogeneity. What disturb the equilibrium is simply outside the scope of the model. Waltz describes neorealism as a systemic theory in which each state's search for security in an anarchic environment generates conflict and competition. He argues that "although neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain war's dismal recurrence through the millennia" a recurrence which" is explained by the structure of the system (Waltz, 1988:620). In an anarchic realm, stability is fragile, since the balance can be disturbed, maintaining that stability requires that states respond to perturbations and that the

equilibrium be quickly and readily restored. It is the failure of the system to re equilibrate that is the cause of War. If the system were functioning correctly, and states immediately responded to changes in the distribution of power, then stability would be maintained (Ibid, 620).

In the bipolar world each great power recognizes from where threats emanate, monitors the relevant other, and responds immediately to actions taken by the other. In contrast, a multipolar world with more than two great powers is one of greater uncertainty. States are uncertain which one of them is threatened by the incremental growth of one (Maurseth, 1964:125). This uncertainty explains the greater War-proneness of multipolar worlds than of bipolar ones; therefore, the working of the balance of power is affected by the uncertainty in a multipolar world.

The balance-of-power equilibrium that emerges from a competitive international system is a kin to the working of the visible hand in the price system. For economists, the interaction of individual greed in a competitive market place results through the visible hand in the counter- intuitive result of the lowest prices for all goods. Individual greed results in maximum collective welfare. Similarly, in international relations, the rapaciousness of some states and the fears of others lead to an intense concentration on power and force, which results in the stable balance of power (Taylor, 1954: 9).

This is the way in which to interpret the characterization of the international state of nature as a state of war. It is a world in which states constantly prepare for war, in which" force remains the final arbiter" (Waltz, 1997:180), and in which there is an "omnipresent threat

of War" (Doyle, 1990:224). In explaining a state of war, realism also explains the occurrence of War. But in this equilibrium state of war, actual war should not break out. The use of phrases such as state of War has obscured that fact that realism is a theory of peace and stability based on the constant preparation for War and not a theory of War at all.

Given this, when scrutinizing the above-mentioned three case-studies in chapter three, it appears that the bipolar system characterizes the relationship between the two super powers, where the United States and the Soviet Union maintain international stability, although the struggle for power was kept within barely tolerable limits by the mutual deterrence provided by nuclear weapon. Thus the world was spared another war engaging the major powers throughout the Cold War era. This was not because of the shortage of conflicts or events, which in an era of purely conventional weapons might well have precipitated a third world war (waltz, 1979:168). Any one of the crisis would probably have been viewed as a cause of war: The Berlin crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, no world war resulted from any of these events is largely due to the existence of nuclear weapons, and to the deterrent effect which their deployment had on the actions of the major powers throughout the Cold War (Delvoie,2002:66).

As for the Czechoslovakia case for example, from the Soviet point of view, Czechoslovakia was too important to be allowed to escape from Soviet control. A Soviet general maintained that the Soviet Union was going into Czechoslovakia "even if it means the outbreak of a third world war" (Dresen, 1999: 2) whilst the Johnson administration had placed an emphasis on bilateral relations as it was already distracted by the war in Vietnam. Hence,

United States won't risk intervening to 'save' Czechoslovakia and risk a nuclear 'third world war'.

Similarly, the Berlin crisis was also neutralized due to the fear of nuclear escalations. Written solely for the President Kennedy and his senior advisers, an official CIA memorandum suggested that "The possible outcomes of some of the more extreme courses of action that might be taken by the United States. It also refers specifically to the possibility that the Berlin crisis might escalate into an intercontinental nuclear exchange… However unlikely that eventuality might be at any given moment. There was, in addition, the menace of theater nuclear weapons (e.g., shorter range weapons for use in Europe), of which both sides had large and growing inventories" (CIA Official Memorandum, 1959: 1-3) [12].

Finally, as far as the Cuban Crises is concerned, the world has never been closer to global nuclear war than during the 13 days of the Cuban missile crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a confrontation between the United States of America, the Soviet Union, and Cuba during the Cold War. The crisis ranks with the Berlin Blockade as one of the major confrontations of the Cold War, and is often regarded as the moment in which the Cold War came closest to escalating into a nuclear war. Kennedy, in his first public speech on the crisis, given on October 22, 1962, gave the key warning; it shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the

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[12] VI-12: CIA Memorandum: Soviet and Other Reactions to Various Courses of Action in the Berlin Crisis, 27 March 1959 (MORI No. 14231).

Soviet Union (Kennedy speech, 1962). The US was deterred from going to war. What deterred the US was the certainty that some Soviet retaliation would take place. Though the Soviets might have suffered more, the fact that the US would not escape unhurt was sufficient to deter the US (Gribkov and Smith, 1994: 7-11).

The crisis ended short of war, when Khrushchev decided to pull the missiles out of Cuba in exchange for an American undertaking to not invade Cuba, and to eventually remove American 'Jupiter' missiles from Turkey.

Apparently, it is worth reiterating here the fact that, when examining the above three cases, it appears that the common dominator that overshadowed US-Soviet conflict prevention relation revolves around the efficacy of balance of power based on nuclear deterrence that played then a crucial role in preventing military conflict and fostering stability alike.

Furthermore, unlike liberalism, realism also managed to better describe the anarchic system within which state of peace and stability comes from spheres of fear and distrust and not of harmonious and cooperative inherent environment. Indeed, from realist perspective, it was only through arms race and competition, the race towards balance of power and terror, and military buildups such form of stability was established between the superpowers during the 1958-1968. Ostensibly, this is in contrary with liberals view, who believe that peace and stability is the normal state of affairs. The Laws of nature dictated harmony and co-operation between peoples, war therefore both unnatural and irrational; they have a belief in progress and the perfectibility of the human condition. Through their faith in the power of human reason and the capacity of human beings to realize their inner potential, they remain

confident that wars can be removed from human experience (Zacher and Matthew, 1995:107-50). They advocate that wars were created by undemocratic governments for their own vested interests. They justify their approach because they are doubtful of the concentrated forms of power, especially state power. When they looked at the international system they saw power being exercised in the interests of governing elites and against the wishes of the masses. They were engineered by a fighter class bent on extending their power and wealth through territorial conquest, in order to provide governments with excuses to raise taxes, and to expand their bureaucratic machinery and increase their control over their citizens. The people on the other hand, were peace loving by nature, and only plunged into conflict by the whims of their deceiving rulers (Howard, 1978:31).Thus wars can be treated only by the twin medicines of democracy and free trade.

However, the paper may understand liberals' perspective in explaining by the end of the Cold War period- détente era where diplomacy succeeded promoting a period of relaxation developed in the late years of 1960s and early 1970s and continued to develop until late 1970s. Such efforts were culminated with concluding the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and Soviet Union in the late 1960s/early 1970s led to further weapons control agreements. The SALT I talks led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an Interim Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT I) and (SALT II), both in 1972 and 1979 respectively. Hence, unlike realism, such historical setting of the Cold War demonstrated that the control and the reduction of arms paved the way towards state on non-war and stability.

In parallel, liberals saw the balance of power as the most destructive aspect of secret diplomacy, for them it was the product of elite conspiracy which resulted in international relations being arranged to suit the interests of those who ruled great powers (Haward, 1978:43). For Gobden the balance of power was the veil behind which the armaments industries enriched themselves through state expenditure on weapons of war (Gobden, 1992:208-9). They advocate that the balance of power had failed to prevent wars, because great power had locked themselves into two aggressive blocs instead of allowing for the flexibility of realigning each other against the aggressor. Collective security was designed to replace balance of power and make it institutional, for liberals this would have two useful results: first it would make the balance of power more effective because there would be fewer chance of a preponderant power emerging. Secondly, it would ensure that violence would always be used in a legitimate manner (Clarck, 1989:23).

The importance of negotiations as a means of preventing or setting armed conflict has been well established. Under conditions of nuclear parity, negotiation increases in significance. Thus, historically the results of armed conflict have on been moderated by negotiations between adversaries, either during armed confrontation or immediately thereafter. Vital national security interests can be no longer be achieved with assurance through armed conflict, either among the superpowers, without the risk of escalation across the spectrum leading to nuclear war. Negotiation becomes more critical, to offset the possibility of escalation to all out nuclear proportion

Even for deterrence, the bargaining efforts and the various elements of national power, especially the threat or use of military forces, must be orchestrated in a unified effort to

achieve a given national security goal. Armed conflict at a given level should be planned and conducted to support negotiating efforts toward a solution while further escalation is being deterred. In the absence of a coordinated effort in support of negotiations by all appropriate elements of national power, substantial diseconomies in financial and human terms are probable, and more important, vital national security interests may be placed at risk (Reed, 1975:1).

There was a role for diplomacy, though short and discrete, in the crisis that happened in the Cold war era, the negotiation that took place between the two superpowers led to prevent them from reaching the brink of war. The diplomacy played a role in the most dangerous episode in the history of the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis has inevitably attracted the attention of many diplomatic historians. With the two superpowers teetering on the brink of war, and possibly a nuclear war at that, the issue of how to remove Russian missiles from Cuba in October 1962, while maintaining the stability, represented the greatest challenge of John F. Kennedy's presidency. And the role played by his brother Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and his contribution to American policy-making and diplomacy during the crisis (White, 2007:1).

When the crisis was at its most intense, it was Robert Kennedy who cleverly devised the plan that ended the superpower confrontation: he advised JFK to write to Nikita S. Khrushchev accepting the terms offered in the Soviet leader's October 26 letter (removal of Russian missiles from Cuba in return for a U.S. promise not to invade the island), while essentially ignoring his October 27 message (which also demanded the withdrawal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey). This, coupled with a promise expressed in person by Robert

Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that the Jupiter missiles would be removed anon but that this must remain a secret component of the settlement, resulted in Khrushchev backing down. In short, Robert Kennedy's contribution had been vitally important in ensuring stability (Allyn, Blight and Welch, 1989: 93).

Robert Kennedy did make a significant contribution to the peaceful resolution of the missile crisis. He helped convince the president that the blockade, rather than military action, was the wisest first step to take; and that the strategy of ignoring Khrushchev's October 27 message but replying affirmatively to his letter of October 26 would prove effective. He also played a valuable diplomatic role by dealing personally with Dobrynin at important moments in the crisis (White, 2007:2).

On the other hand diplomacy played a role in the Berlin crisis, by shedding a light on the roles of Harold Macmillan and Nikita Khrushchev and their efforts to achieve a compromise settlement on the pivotal Berlin Crisis. Macmillan acted to prevent the crisis sliding into a disastrous nuclear conflict. His visit to Moscow in 1959 was a success, which convinced Khrushchev of a sincere effort to achieve a lasting settlement (Newman, 2006: 50).

In short, the above analysis provided that realism became the most relevant school of though that explained the 1958-1968 Cold War era between the two superpowers. As shown above, stability under realism can be achieved through the working of the balance of power while liberalism managed to explain short term episode of such era within such period. Indeed, there is a close correlation between balance of power and deterrence in that

the heavier the scale of balance of power is of one party (e.g. nuclear), the higher the retaliations as well as consequences are on the other/opponent party. Thus, nuclear deterrence of both superpowers shall accordingly enforce the argument that contends state of stability mainly accrued through the effective role of nuclear deterrence with the inability of either superpower to overcome the retaliatory forces of the other enhance the stability of the system (Waltz, 1979:168).

Conclusion

The anarchic political structure of the international system, the evolution, and the diffusion of military technology brought out the problem of states security. In this context the issue was how to ensure human survival in an environment dominated by immense powers of destruction. States relate to each other through the mechanism of the balance of power, they compete with each other for dominance over the ordering of global economic and political relations. Military power is essential to the security of states, competitive accumulations of military power generate arms racing and security dilemma, therefore, ambition and miscalculation are still available as paths to war. Though, within nuclear deterrence context, it appears that the episode that overshadowed US-Soviet relations during the Cold War has its own peculiarities where war was the last/or non optional resort for the two competing powers.

Due to these circumstances, deterrence during the Cold War turned into an elaborate national security strategy. Without the Cold War, it would probably have remained an "occasional stratagem" (Freedman, 1966:1). As a strategy, it offers an elaborate guide for bringing military power to bear on central national security objectives. It became the dominant strategy, the one on which great powers bet their lives. Indeed, the Cold War, in the first instance, was not an episode like other wars of modern times; it was invented to describe a state of affairs. The principle ingredient in this state of affairs was the mutual hostility and fears of the protagonists; their emotions were rooted in their several historical and political differences and were powerfully stimulated by myths which at times turned

hostility into hatred. Thus, it dominated world affairs for a generation and more and gave birth to the bipolar world, as an international system in which the new superpowers maintained a precarious nuclear balance.

To this end, the paper questioned the extent to which nuclear deterrence triggered state of non war and stability between the two superpowers particularly during the period of 1958-1968 taking those main crises that threatened to escalate into world wars but never did: notably the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949) , the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and the Czechoslovakian crises of 1968.

Indeed, the term Cold War was introduced to describe the emerging tensions between the two super powers. It was an ideological struggle, and a multi-faceted conflict. It also comprised propaganda, psychology, rival military coalitions, espionage, military, industrial and technological developments, costly defense spending, a massive conventional and nuclear arms race, financial, military numerous proxy wars. Despite this struggle, there was never a direct military engagement between the US and Soviet Union, but there was a half–century of military build-up. Nuclear weapons became key elements in maintaining an international security system which is virtually free from danger of international major wars among the great powers. because of nuclear weapons does the interdependence of security become so obvious that national security and international security can be pursued simultaneously, and because of nuclear weapons can survival serve as the basis for a new politics of common security among states, in other words, nuclear weapons are the essential foundation on which international security can be built in a system with a durable anarchic political structure.

Upon these main guidelines, the paper accordingly concludes that over the course of the Cold War, mutual nuclear deterrence built around survivable Retaliatory capabilities on both sides, made strategic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union predictably stable. Throughout the period, the rivalry between the two superpowers was played out in multiple arenas and has been characterized by a number of flash-points around the globe which threatened to turn the Cold War into hot one. Both countries would be deterred from highly challenging behavior by a mutual fear of escalation to a general war in which the level of nuclear destruction to the civilian infrastructure and population would far exceed any possible gain for either side. Consequently, each would avoid provoking the other in the extreme.

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الولايات المتحدة واتحاد الجمهوريات الاشتراكية السوفياتية وخيار الردع النووي خلال الحرب الباردة
(1958 – 1968)

إعداد

هالة هاني محمد ابو غزالة

المشرف

الدكتور وليد خالد أبو دلبوح

ملخـــــص

تبحث هذه الاطروحة وبتوسع في حقبة الحرب الباردة بكل اضدادها وقلاقلها ومخاطرها غير القابلة للسؤال عنها والتي مثلتها انذاك القوتان العظميان خلال الفترة ما بين 1958 – 1968 . وفي الحقيقة فان تطوير اسلحة نووية قد دفع بقوة للتاثير على نيران القوى والردع على حد سواء من حيث الحؤول دون اندلاع النزاع وهي تبعا لذلك تعتبر عامل استقرار حاسم في النظام الدولي لما بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية.

وعليه، تستهدف هذه الاطروحة التوصل الى تفهم المدى الذي اثرت فيه التكنولوجيا النووية، من جهة، والردع من جهة اخرى، في مسيرة العلاقات الاميركية السوفياتية خلال الحرب الباردة. كما انها ستحاول استشراق ما اذا كانت الحوادث الساخنة المختلفة بين القوتين العظميين خلال الاعوام 1958 – 1968 كما تم استعراضه في اطار الحالات التجريبية قد خففت او قوضت قابلية وتاثير الردع كخيار استراتيجي للحفاظ على حالة الاستقرار الدولي وتنتهج الدراسة بتوسع طريقة وصفية وتحليلية تستند الى اسس تاريخية ولقد اصبحت المصادر والادلة شانها شان ادبيات ثانوية المصدر الرئيس للمعلومات نظرا لطبيعة هذه الدراسة.

وباختصار تستنتج الاطروحة انه طيلة مدة العشر سنوات من الحرب الباردة كان الرادع النووي مبنيا حول مقدرات رد مستدامة لدى الجانبين على حد سواء اصبحت في اطارها العلاقات الاستراتيجية بين الولايات المتحدة الاميركية واتحاد الجمهوريات الاشتراكية السوفياتية مستقرة على مدار الوقت بشكل يمكن التكهن به. ونتيجة لذلك لم تندلع حرب عالمية جديدة بغض النظر عن مدى حسم وجدية الحوادث التي كسبت زخما انذاك.